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CharterW\\hou\? The Supreme
Court of Canada, Transnational Crime
and Constitutional Rights and Freedoms

The first decades of the Supreme Court of Canada's Charter jurisprudence have
coincided roughly with an increase in the extent to which Canada is affected by
transnational crime and the nation's consequential participation in inter-state efforts
to combat it. The Court itself has remarked on its discrete "jurisprudence on matters
involving Canada's international co-operation in criminal investigations and
prosecutions." This article examines the Court's adoption of a different approach to
Charter analysis in cases involving transnational elements and surveys where the
Court has "drawn the line" in terms ofCharter application.
By way of analyzing jurisprudence on exclusion of evidence gathered abroad,
extradition, deportation and mutual legal assistance, the author critiques the Supreme
Court's approach to Charter analysis in cases with a transnational criminal aspect.
He argues that deference to the government in its perceived need for inter-state comity
has led to less rigour in the Court's application of domestic human rights standards to
individuals who are facing extradition or who are being criminally investigated by
and/or in another state. In conclusion, the author calls for a more robust approach to
Charter application in such cases and argues that concern about extra-territorial
application of the Charter does not necessarily justify a diminished level of human
rights protection for individuals facing foreign process.
Les premieres decennies de /'application, par la Cour supreme du Canada, des
dispositions de la Charte ont coincide avec une intensification des repercussions de
la criminalite transnationale pour le Canada et, consequemment, de sa participation
a la lutte concertee des pays contre cette criminalite. La Cour meme a d'ailleurs
affirm^ que «le fait d'etablir une distinction... est compatible avec la jurisprudence
de notre Cour en ce qui concerns la participation du Canada a des enquetes et
poursuites crimine/les internationales.» Get article examine /'adoption par la Cour
supreme d'une analyse distincte de la Charte qu'elle applique specifiquement aux
affaires ou sont en cause des elements transnationaux, et tente de determiner oil la
Cour a trace la ligne de demarcation pour ce qui est de /'application de la Charte.
Par le biais de son analyse de la jurisprudence sur /'exclusion d'elements de
preuve recueillis a I'etranger, sur I'extradition, sur /'expulsion et sur I'entraide juridique
en matiere criminel/e, I'auteur critique I'approche adoptee par la Cour supreme face
a la Charte dans les affaires ou entre en jeu la criminalite transnationale. L'auteur
avance que le fait de s'en remettre a I'Etat, a cause du besoin percu de faire preuve
de courtoisie envers d'autres Etats, a mene a un affaiblissement de la rigueur avec
laquelle la Cour applique les normes nationales relatives aux droits de I'homme aux
particuliers susceptibles d'extradition ou qui font I'objet d'enquetes crimine/les par
un autre pays ou dans un autre pays. En conclusion, I'auteur reclame une approche
plus musclee pour ce qui est de /'application de la Charte dans les affaires de ce
type, et II allegue que les preoccupations quant a /'application de la Charte a I'&tranger
ne justifient pas necessairement la reduction de la protection des droits de I'homme
pour les particuliers qui risquent de faire face a des procedures etrangeres.
*
Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University. This paper is an updated and partially revised version of
one presented at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Law and Society Association at Dalhousie
University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, on June 4, 2003, and I am grateful for the thoughtful and intriguing
feedback I received during and after that presentation. Special thanks are due to my colleagues Hugh
Kindred, Jennifer Llewellyn and Constance Macintosh, and to Donald A. Macintosh, for their insights and assistance. I am particularly indebted to my colleague Steve Coughlan for generously
donating time and energy to engaging me on various aspects of my analysis.
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Introduction
A society is defined by the manner in which the state treats the people over
whom it exercises power. This is, perhaps, one of the philosophical concerns that motivated the birth and subsequent development of legal regimes protecting human rights, both in Canada and internationally. In the
twenty-plus years since the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,^ the Supreme Court of Canada has engaged in a fascinating and
visionary expansion of the individual rights constitutionalized by that document, producing a jurisprudence that has earned respect on an international scale. Every corner of our criminal law, in particular, has been infused with Charter values, as the Court and Parliament continue to
develop the permissible balance between crime suppression and protec-

1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
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tion of human rights.2 A vast jurisprudence (and a vast literature) is accessible for every part of criminal law enforcement, be it search warrants,
suspect questioning or the inclusion or exclusion of evidence at trial.
A topic that has received less attention is the kind of limitation that the
Court has placed on Charter rights where there is an international or
transnational aspect to the matter being adjudicated. The first decades of
Charter jurisprudence have roughly coincided with a significant expansion in Canada's co-operation in international (and specifically inter-state)
efforts to combat both transnational and international crime.3 What makes
this interesting is that the Court's perceptions of how Charter standards
should be applied domestically, and how they should be applied when there
is a transnational aspect to the matter, are different. The Court itself has
remarked on the existence of a seemingly separate "jurisprudence on
matters involving Canada's international co-operation in criminal investigations and prosecutions."4 I have suggested elsewhere that the nexus
between individual rights and the international aspect of a criminal matter
has been central to the Court's "re-jigging" of Charter application in such
cases.5 My starting point is that litigants before Canadian courts who are
facing extradition or criminal investigation by another state appear to come
under a different, though Charter-based, regime wherein human rights can
be subordinated to the larger interests of inter-state comity. This essay

2. See generally Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Scarborough,
Ont: Carswell, 2001); Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter's Impact on the Canadian Criminal Justice
System (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1996).
3. For present purposes, "transnational crime" denotes domestic crimes that involve, for some
reason, another state; a simple example would be the murderer who flees from one country to another, or a drug trafficker who deals in one country but banks in another. See generally Louise I.
Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State?" (1995) 48 J.
Int'l Aff. 463; Grenhard O.W. Mueller, "Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts," in Phil
Williams & Dimitri Vlassis, eds., Combating Transnational Crime (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
This term is used as distinct from "international crime," properly understood as dealing with acts for
which individual criminal liability attaches at the international level, such as war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide. These crimes may be subject to actual international penalty; the
foregoing offences, for example, make up most of the list of crimes over which the International
Criminal Court has jurisdiction. International crimes may also be prosecuted domestically by states
under treaty regimes and/or customary international law principles of jurisdiction (e.g., torture, piracy), which gives rise to the potential for intersection between the two. For interesting background,
see Neil Boister, "'Transnational Criminal Law'?" (2003) 14 E.J.I.L. 953. Also see generally Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
4. Per L'Heureux-Dube J. in her majority reasons in Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 841 at para. 34 [Schreiber], citing Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500 at 518519 [Schmidt]; Argentina v. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536 at 547 [Mellino]; Kindler v. Canada (Minister ofjiistice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 at 831, LaForest J., and at 896, McLachlin J. [Kindler].
5. Robert J. Currie, "Schreiber v. Canada (A.G.)", Case Comment (1999) 8 Dal. J. Leg. Stud. 207
at 214-19 [Currie, "Schreiber Case Comment"].
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represents a first attempt to articulate what the Supreme Court of Canada
has found to be different about such cases, and also a critical inquiry as to
the propriety and limits to such "difference" as does exist.
At issue, then, is a fundamental decision to be made when a state
administers its human rights law in a context that has international dimensions: how much protection do individuals merit when they are facing
legal process (usually criminal), or extra-legal "treatment," in another state?
Does what is going, or likely, to happen to them in the other state matter?
I will argue here that deference to the government in the face of obligations to other states, as well as inter-state comity generally, has led to less
rigour in the Court's application of our domestic human rights standards to
individuals who are facing extradition or who are being criminally investigated by another state.
This is, I submit, an interesting time to make this inquiry, as the
Supreme Court has recently taken the opportunity to answer a couple of
the major questions which crop up. In United States v. Burns and Rafay,6
the Court faced the issue of whether Canada could, and constitutionally
should, extradite people to face the death penalty in the requesting jurisdiction. In Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship andImmigration) ,7 a
similar question: will Canada deport an individual to a state where they
face torture? In each case, the answer from a unanimous Court was a
troublingly qualified "no." Similar questions are beginning to develop
from the practice of providing mutual legal assistance in criminal matters,
though the case law is much less developed. These three settings, in part
because of the international aspects, entail an odd mixture of criminal law,
criminal procedure, and administrative law.
What concerns me is this: where does the Charter end? To what extent
should the Courts use the Charter to protect the human rights of people
who have faced or are facing violation of those rights by another state?
It may seem something of a tidy-desk question. However, how Canada
answers these questions has serious implications, not just for the individuals shipped off to face certain or uncertain fates in other states but for our
own human rights jurisprudence and, potentially, our commitments under
international human rights conventions. Using the above-noted cases,
inter alia, as touchstones, I will attempt to articulate exactly where it is
that the Court draws the line, and the implications that the line has for
matters where both human rights and inter-state criminal co-operation are
engaged.

6.
1.

[2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7 [Burns].
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1 [Suresh].
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This essay will proceed in three sections. The first section will deal
with the basics of Charter application in terms of to whom it applies and
where. It will focus on the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the idea of
extra-territorial application of the Charter as expressed in criminal cases
concerning the admissibility of evidence taken abroad. The next section
will focus on extradition and especially the Burns decision, critically examining the case law which led to it and the implications which flow from
the current constitutional analysis being used by the Court. In terms of
where the Court has drawn the line regarding Charter application I will
argue that the Court's reliance on section 7 of the Charter is misplaced, in
particular where the possibility of gross human rights violations in the
requesting state is an issue, and that section 12 is the more appropriate lens
through which to scrutinize extradition (and, since Suresh, deportation).
The third section will survey how the Charter is applied to mutual legal
assistance law and practice, and posit some indication that Charter standards are being applied more loosely than would be the case domestically,
though without a great deal of thoughtful consideration of the issue. Some
justification for re-ordering the priority of relationship between human
rights and international criminal co-operation will be offered thereafter.

I. The Application of the Charter
1. Personal Application
The most important sections for present purposes are 7, 8, 9 and 12,8 all of
which begin "everyone has the right." These sections clearly have a wider
application than some of the others, for example sections 3,6 and 23, which
apply to "citizens of Canada."9 In Singh v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration,110 Wilson J. interpreted "everyone" as including everyone who
entered Canada, even those who entered illegally. This broad interpretation was supported in Suresh, where the Court confirmed what appeared to
be a Crown concession that "everyone" included refugees who were subject to deportation.11
8. Section 7 protects life, liberty and security of person and the right not to be deprived thereof
"except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice"; Section 8 protects against unreasonable search or seizure; Section 9 protects against arbitrary detention or imprisonment; and Section 12 protects against any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.
9. And, in the case of Section 23, is even further narrowed to apply to certain citizens based on
their linguistic status.
10. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
11. Suresh, supra note 7 at para. 44, though this was not much of a concession given Federal Court
jurisprudence relating to the application of section 7 in deportation cases — as well as the Supreme
Court of Canada's own approach to the application of section 7. In this regard, see Dehghani v.
Canada (M.E.I.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053 at 1075. I am grateful to Donald Macintosh for this insight.
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It may be sufficient to note that the above-noted Charter rights apply
to at least every corporeal human being12 who faces some interaction with
the state and its agencies. Indeed, as set out in the Cook13 case (discussed
below), this interaction need not even occur on Canadian soil.
2. Territorial Application
Section 32 of the Charter states that it applies to "the Parliament and government of Canada" (including the Territories) and "the legislature and
government of each province." For the most part, the Charter has been
utilized to test the actions of governmental bodies on Canadian soil. The
general principle at international law is that states may not exercise jurisdiction (particularly criminal jurisdiction) outside their own borders.14 The
Court has been willing to apply the Charter to domestic processes that
engage international issues; for example, in Schmidt, La Forest J. stated:
"There can be no doubt that the actions undertaken by the Government of
Canada in extradition as in other matters are subject to scrutiny under the
Charter (s. 32)."15 However, it has shown great distaste for the prospect of
extra-territorial application, and has generally relied upon international
law principles regarding jurisdiction to buttress a territorial interpretation
of section 32.16
Perhaps unsurprisingly, what judicial debate has taken place about potential extraterritorial application of the Charter has been in cases where
either extradition (dealt with below) or transnational crime was involved.
R. v. Harrer dealt with the latter category of case. The appellant had been
questioned in Michigan by U.S. officials and gave statements implicating
herself in criminal conduct in Canada. At trial in Canada, she sought to
have these statements excluded on the basis that she had not received a
right-to-counsel warning in accordance with Charter standards. In his
majority reasons dismissing the appeal, Justice La Forest concluded that
the Charter did not apply to the interrogations "because the governments
mentioned in s. 32(1) were not implicated in these activities."17 To apply

12. I.e., excluding corporations, insofar as some of the Charter rights are not amenable to application to these "legal persons"; see the discussion of this point in Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of
Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf (Toronto: Thomson, 1997) at 34-1 to 34-7.
13. R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 [Cook].
14. Hugh M. Kindred et al., eds., International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada,
6th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2000); see particularly c. 9, especially p. 507, n. 4 and sources
cited therein. See also R. v. Libman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178; Cook, ibid.
15. Supra note 4 at 518.
16. Schmidt, ibid.; R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 at paras. 10-12 [Harrer]; R. v. Terry, [1996] 2
S.C.R. 207 at paras. 14-19 [Terry].
17. Harrer, ibid, at para. 12.
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the Charter to foreign state agents acting within their own country "would
truly be giving the Charter impermissible extraterritorial application .
... [I]t is obvious that Canada cannot impose its procedural requirements
in proceedings undertaken by other states in their own territories."18
Justice La Forest did, however, leave the door open to what one might
call "permissible" extraterritorial application of the Charter, stating that
different issues would arise if (1) it had been Canadian police questioning
Harrer, or (2) if the American authorities had been acting as agents of the
Canadian police.19 It was not clear at the time what either of these meant,
and the second door, at least, appeared to be closing the following year in
R. v. Terry, a case where the appellant fled to California after allegedly
committing a murder in British Columbia. He was questioned by (and gave
a statement to) U.S. police acting on a request from Canadian police, and
was advised of his right to counsel in accordance with U.S. procedure,
which did not conform to Canadian standards. Refusing to exclude the
statement on this basis, McLachlin J. for the Court referred to "the exclusivity of the foreign state's sovereignty within its territory, where its law
alone governs the process of enforcement."20 She confirmed the Court's
refusal to apply Charter standards to foreign police even if they were
co-operating with Canadian authorities, stating specifically that "any
cooperative investigation involving law enforcement agencies of Canada
and the United States will be governed by the laws of the jurisdiction in
which the activity is undertaken."21
In R. v. Cook,22 however, Justice La Forest's speculation in Harrer about
extra-territorial application of the Charter bore fruit. Cook fled to the U.S.
after committing a murder in Canada. Detained by local authorities in
Louisiana, he was questioned by two Canadian detectives who gave a defective right-to-counsel warning. At his trial in Canada, Cook sought to
have the statement given to the Canadian detectives excluded. A majority
of the Court held that Charter standards applied to the actions of the Canadian detectives while they were in the U.S. A two-part justification was
posited: first, this was not an objectionable extra-territorial application of
the Charter because the Canadian law was being applied to the detectives
on the basis of their nationality, another well-known "[j]urisdictional
competence under international law."23 As arms of the Canadian state, they

18.
19.
20.
7.1.
21.
22.
23.

Ibid, at paras. 10, 15.
Ibid, at para. 11.
Terry, supra note 16 at para. 19.
Ihid
Ibid.
Supra note 13.
AW., para. 41.

242

The Dalhousie Law Journal

were inherently amenable to Charter jurisdiction — irrespective, apparently, of their geographical location. Second, applying the Charter to this
interrogation, even though it occurred on U.S. territory, did not interfere
with American sovereignty since it was directed at the activities of Canadian officers acting within the context of a Canadian investigation, aimed
at the ultimate result of a criminal trial in Canada.24 For a domestic court to
apply the Charter at the subsequent trial did not engage American sovereign rights in any way, and thus applying the Charter extra-territorially
was permissible in such "rare circumstances"25 as this case demonstrated.
The rather original application of the nationality principle of jurisdiction in Cook notwithstanding,26 this line of cases27 demonstrates what I
submit is a well-placed exercise in line-drawing by the Court.28 The idea
of applying Charter standards to foreign authorities is largely unworkable, since those authorities can only operate according to the laws of their
own state. Their practices will, one would think, inevitably conflict with
some aspects of what the Canadian courts have deemed to be constitutionally acceptable practice, even in a state with similar individual rights
standards such as the U.S. Canadian courts are ill-suited to adjudicating
upon foreign legal process, and any insistence on so doing would have the
potential to create political problems best left to resolution by the federal
government under its foreign relations jurisdiction. This is why there is a
presumption against this practice in our domestic law and at international
law.29 Even if the Court was stretching in Cook to find that the Charter
application was not impermissibly extra-territorial in effect, it did so
modestly in that our courts did not have to adjudicate upon foreign legal
process, nor upon the acts of foreign officials, in making their findings.

24. Ibid, at paras. 41-47; for what appears to be the ratio decidendi, see para. 48, and also para. 53.
25. Ibid, at para. 25.
26. "Original" in that this basis of jurisdiction usually relates to the nationality of the offender, as
opposed to a law enforcement officer; and that "[c]ommon law countries... have been reticent in
their use of this principle" (Kindred et a!., supra note 14 at 517).
27. As well as the Court's decision in Schreiber v. Canada (A.G.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841 [Schreiber],
discussed below at 286-88, see also Currie, "Schreiber Case Comment", supra note 5.
28. Professor Morgan pithily describes Harrer as follows: "Taking as a starting point the notion
that Charter rights pertain to the time of arrest or detention rather than to the time of trial at which
the evidence is admitted, Justice La Forest led the majority of the Court on a journey to see how far
into the international arena—how far toward a foreign arrest and interrogation—the Canadian constitution could travel. As it turned out, the Charter did not travel well at all, and was yanked back
home by a special Dolphin Delivery almost as soon as it threatened to take flight" (Ed Morgan, "In
the Penal Colony: Internationalism and the Canadian Constitution" (1999) 49 U.T.L.J. 447 at 462).
29. R. v. Spencer, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278; Schmidt, supra note 4; Harrer, supra note 16 at para.10.
See also Terry, supra note 16 at para. 16: "This Court has repeatedly affirmed the territorial limitations imposed on Canadian law by the principles of state sovereignty and international comity."
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Applying Canadian law to the conduct of Canadian police officers at a
Canadian trial is not particularly offensive.30
This is particularly the case with the arrest and detention rights under
section 10 of the Charter; it may be noteworthy that Harrer, Terry and
Cook were all about allegedly defective right-to-counsel cautions. As the
Court has pointed out, when a person leaves Canada they leave behind
Canadian procedural protections and must submit to the law of the state to
which they have gone.31 The locus of their interaction with the authorities
of the foreign state is not within the purview of our courts. If the acts of the
foreign authorities are so egregious as to make the resulting trial in Canada
unfair, then the accused can apply to have the evidence excluded under
sections 7, ll(d)32 and 24(2)33of the Charter.™ Whether the conduct of
foreign authorities is in conformity with Canadian standards, or even their
own domestic standards, are factors that the courts can consider in deciding whether to exclude.35
The ultimate goal, as Justice La Forest stated in Harrer, is "a just
accommodation between the interests of the individual and those of the
state in providing a fair and workable system of justice."36 In this respect,
the Court's concern about not adjudicating upon the legal processes of
other states makes sense. However, all of these cases involved people who
ended up in Canada and faced Canadian legal process; Charter fair trial
protection was ultimately available to them ex post facto even without the
benefit of its procedural protections ex ante. To put it simply, we know
what's going to happen to them here. We know specifically that they will

30. Still open is the question of whether the Charter might be applied to foreign police if they were
acting as "agents" of Canadian police. The Court discussed this in Harrer, Terry and Cook but has
shown what is likely prudent reluctance to say much about it. For a discussion, see Currie, "Schreiber
Case Comment", supra note 5 at 211, n. 21.
31. Schreiber, supra note 27 at paras. 23-24, Lamer J.; Terry, supra note 16 at para. 24; Harrer,
supra note 16 at para. 50.
32. Affirming the accused's presumption of innocence until proven guilty by an independent tribunal.
3 3. Providing for the exclusion of evidence when obtained in a manner that would bring the justice
system into disrepute.
34. An interesting ruling on the related point of the admissibility of evidence obtained by the
violation of human rights of persons other than the individual litigant was recently made in a refugee
case, Lai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 179 at para. 24: "...evidence obtained by torture, or other means precluded by the International Convention against Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ought not to be relied upon by a
panel considering a refugee application."
35. Harrer, supra note 16 at paras. 13-18; Terry, supra note 16 at para. 25. Though I realize that
this does lead to the question of the effectiveness of the Charter regime regarding exclusion of
evidence at trial, see Don Stuart, "Eight Plus Twenty-Four Two Equal Zero" (1998), 13 C.R. (5th) 50.
36. Harrer, supra note 16 at para. 14.

244

The Dalhousie Law Journal

not be executed upon conviction, or tortured, or imprisoned for thirty years
for a minor drug possession offence. Where the presumption against
scrutinizing foreign process becomes disturbing is where the person
involved will face process or treatment in another state, and it is to those
kinds of settings I will now turn.

II. Extradition and Deportation
Charter engagement with transnational criminal issues is perhaps at its
highest pitch when the state physically detains individuals and sends them
to another state, particularly where they may face legal process or extralegal harm there.37 This has traditionally been done by way of extradition,
on the basis of a treaty or other arrangement between Canada and other
states. In recent years, the practice of deportation/refoulement of individuals has taken on some relation to Canadian transnational criminal law practice, particularly after the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Finta3S when
the government began to deport alleged war criminals rather than extradite or prosecute them. 39 The Charter has application to both
processes, and the Supreme Court of Canada's adoption of its analysis in
Burns for the purpose of evaluating deportation in Suresh gives deportation particular significance here.40
This section begins with brief overviews of extradition and deportation as mechanisms for the rendition of individuals. It then outlines the

37. Indeed, the interaction of international criminal co-operation and human rights has been a "hotbutton" topic for some time; as Professor Christine Van den Wyngaert wrote in 1990, "[i]t is fashionable nowadays to discuss the problems that arise from the application of general human rights to
extradition" ("Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's
Box?" (1990) 39 I.C.L.Q. 757 at 757). See also Otto Lagodny, "Human Rights and Extradition"
(1991) 62 Rev. I.D.P. 45; Sharon A. Williams, "Human Rights Safeguards and International Cooperation in Extradition: Striking the Balance" (1992) 3 Crim. L. F. 191; various essays in Albin Eser
& Otto Lagodny, eds., Principles and Procedures for a New Transnational Criminal Law (Freiburg:
Max Planck Institute, 1992); John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, "Reconciling Extradition
With Human Rights" (1998) 92 A.J.I.L. 187; Robert J. Currie, "Human Rights and International
Mutual Legal Assistance: Resolving the Tension" (2000) 11 Crim. L. F. 143 [Currie, "International
Mutual Legal Assistance and Human Rights"]; William C. Gilmore, "The Provisions Designed to
Protect Fundamental Human Rights in Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties," in Commonwealth Secretariat, International Co-operation in Criminal Matters: Balancing the Protection
of Human Rights with the Needs of Law Enforcement (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001);
Neil Bolster, "Human Rights Protections in the Suppression Conventions" (2002) 2 Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 199.
38. (1994), 28 C.R. (4th) 265.
39. Kindred et al, supra note 14 at 710, n. 15 and accompanying text.
40. For a thorough and recent survey, see Donald A. Macintosh, "Human Rights in the Context of
Extradition and Deportation" (2003) 8 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 169.
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manner in which the Charter has been applied in both settings, and
specifically the ultimate decision of surrender/deportation made by the
relevant government Minister. The Charter analysis used by the Supreme
Court will be critiqued, and an alternative approach offered.
1. Overview of Extradition
Extradition is a form of inter-state cooperation, "an act, usually pursuant
to treaty, under which the executive of one state, the requested state,
surrenders a person within its territory to another state, the requesting state,
in order to face criminal proceedings in the latter state."41 It is a technique
of ancient origin that has become a fundamental tool in enabling states to
prosecute crimes over which they have jurisdiction, and represents a workable way to deal with impediments created by the primarily territorial
basis of the criminal law in most national legal systems. While it is
formally an executive act, most states provide some judicial participation
in the process, and persons facing extradition are able to invoke human
rights protection schemes in those states which have them.42
A thorough review of Canadian extradition law and practice is far beyond the scope of this paper, particularly given that a new Extradition
Act43 was brought in by the federal government in 1999. Thus, the vast
bulk of the existing case law deals with extradition legislation that is no
longer in existence.44 Suffice it to say for the moment that extradition has
two primary phases: the judicial phase, where an "extradition judge" (of
the Supreme Court or Queen's Bench level) evaluates the materials

41. Anne Warner La Forest, "The Balance Between Liberty and Comity in the Evidentiary Requirements Applicable to Extradition Proceedings" (2002) 28 Queen's L. J. 95 at 96 [LaForest, "The
Balance Between Liberty and Comity"]. See generally Geoff Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998); Anne Warner La Forest, La Forest's Extradition to and From Canada, 3rd ed. (Aurora, Ont: Canada Law Book, 1991) [La Forest, Extradition]; Michael Abbell, Extradition To And From The United States (New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2001); Alun Jones, Jones on Extradition and Mutual Assistance (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 2001).
42. See generally Gilbert, ibid, at 78-141, c. 4.
43. S.C. 1999, c. 18.
44. The primary resource for proceedings under the former legislation is La Forest, Extradition,
supra note 41; see also Sharon A. Williams and J.-G. Castel, Canadian Criminal Law: International
and Transnational Aspects (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981), c. 25. For review of post-Charter developments, see J.-G. Castel and Sharon A. Williams, "The Extradition of Canadian Citizens and Sections 1 and 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1987) 25 Can. Y.B. Int'l. 263;
Paul Michell, "Domestic Rights and International Responsibilities: Extradition Under the Canadian
Charter" (1998) 23 Yale J. Int'l. L. 141; and Amanda J. Spencer, "Fugitive Rights: The Role of the
Charter in Extradition Cases" (1993) 51 U.T. Fac. L.Rev. 54. A newer resource that contains a full
comparison of the old and new acts (albeit one written by current or former federal Crown personnel) is Elaine Krivel et al., A Practical Guide to Canadian Extradition (Toronto: Carswell, 2002).
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submitted by the foreign state and decides whether the individual should
be committed for rendition to the requesting state; and the ministerial phase,
where the Minister of Justice renders a discretionary decision on whether
the person should ultimately be surrendered.45
Human rights issues, and in particular Charter application, are engaged
at both of these stages. However, consideration of an individual's ultimate
fate at the hands of the requesting state occurs in the ministerial phase, in
both the Minister's decision and judicial review thereof. This is where the
Court has drawn lines regarding the extent of Charter protection of these
individuals vis-a-vis their potential fate in the requesting state, and it is on
this phase that I intend to focus here.46
2. Overview of Deportation
Deportation is, in Canada, a creature of immigration and refugee law.47 A
deportation order is the most compulsory form of "removal order"48 and
provides for the physical removal of an individual from Canada where he/
she is ruled to be "inadmissible" on the basis of various grounds outlined
in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, such as security,49 serious
criminality,50 or misrepresentation.51 If the Minister of Immigration and
Citizenship receives a report indicating that an individual may be inadmis-

45. See the remarks of Watt J. in Germany v. Schreiber, [2004] O.J. No. 2310 (S.C.J.) (QL) at para.
7: "The extradition process includes two discrete phases: the judicial phase[;] the ministerial or
executive phase[.] The judicial phase includes court proceedings whose objective it is to decide
whether a factual and legal basis for extradition exists. In the end, and only if the judicial phase
results in an order of committal, it will be for the Minister to say whether the fugitive will be surrendered."
46. For an excellent and critical examination of the judicial phase under the new legislation, and
particularly evidentiary standards therein, see La Forest, "The Balance Between Liberty and Comity," supra note 41. See also the reasons of Koenigsberg J. in United Mexican States v. Ortega,
[2004] B.C.J. No. 402 (B.C.S.C.) (QL).
47. Which is governed in Canada by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27
(IRPA), most of which came into force on June 28, 2002. The proceedings in Suresh were held under
the former Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, which IRPA repealed. IRPA contains some significant changes to the deportation processes, including adding some restrictiveness to appeals (see
Andrew Z. Wlodyka, "Appeal Rights for Foreign Nationals, Permanent Residents and their Family
Members Found Inadmissible on Grounds Concerning Security, Human Rights Violations, Organized Criminality, Other Criminality and Mispresentation" (Paper presented to the Canadian Bar
Association's National Citizenship and Immigration Law Conference, 30 April 2004) [unpublished,
on file with author]). For concordance between the old and new acts, see Frank N. Marrocco and
Henry M. Goslett, The 2004 Annotated IRPA of Canada (Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2003). References herein are to IRPA.
48. The term also encompasses "exclusion orders" and "departure orders"; see generally Davies
B.N. Bagambiire, Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1996),
c. 7.
49. IRPA, supra note 47 at s. 34.
50. Ibid., s. 36.
51. Ibid., s. 40.
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sible, the matter can be referred to the Immigration Division52 for a hearing to determine the matter. This decision is appealable to the Immigration
Appeal Division,53 which is in turn subject to judicial review.54
For the purpose of the present discussion, it will suffice to note that
deportation applies to foreign nationals, including refugee claimants.55 Also
noteworthy is section 115 oflRPA, which provides that refugees cannot be
removed to a country "where they would be at risk of persecution for reasons of race, religion.. .or at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment,"56 unless they are inadmissible on grounds including serious criminality or security, inter alia?1
3. Charter Application at the Ministerial Phase of Extradition:
Schmidt to Burns
Extradition is a unique animal, a strange intersection of the outer boundaries of criminal law, criminal procedure, administrative law, international
law and constitutionalized human rights.58 The Court's post-Charter jurisprudence on extradition59 displays a tension between Canada's need to
fulfill its objectives in facilitating the sending of fugitives to face criminal
justice in appropriate jurisdictions, and the protection of the rights of individuals while they are in Canada. While never questioning that the Charter does apply to extradition proceedings,60 the Court has repeatedly emphasized the vital need for Canada to be an active participant in crime

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Ibid., ss. 45, 46.
Ibid., Division 7.
Ibid., Division 8.
Ibid., Part 2.
Ibid.,s. 115(1).
Ibid., s. 115(2).
It has been described less charitably:
[Extradition] is a procedure on the margins of the criminal justice system, enjoys few
formally protected due process safeguards, and often concerns cases that challenge any
claim to fairness at all. The requesting state needs only to produce, in documentary form,
aprima facie case. The process relies upon the "good faith of nations" to ensure that the
fugitive is not in effect being hijacked with false evidence to face an unfair trial. The
fugitive, whose probable guilt is assumed for the purposes of the process, has no right of
confrontation, no right to challenge the facts or the witnesses brought against him (Dianne
L. Martin, "Extradition, The Charter and Due Process: Is Procedural Fairness Enough?"
(2002) 16 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 161 at 166-67).
59. Which was heavily dominated by Justice La Forest until his departure from the Court; see
Robert Sze-Kwok Wai, "Justice Gerard La Forest and the Internationalist Turn in Canadian Jurisprudence," in Rebecca Johnson et al, eds., Gerard V. La Forest at the Supreme Court of Canada 19851997 (Winnipeg: Canadian Legal History Project, 2000) at 471, particularly at 478-480. For this
reason, I will refer to the "La Forest Court" when discussing the decisions from that time.
60. Schmidt, supra note 4 at 518.
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suppression on the international level. It has identified this need as being
"pressing and substantial" in terms of the applicability of the Oakes test
for the application of section 1 of the Charter.61 As La Forest J. wrote in
United States of America v. Cotroni:
The investigation, prosecution and suppression of crime for the protection
of the citizen and the maintenance of peace and public order is an important
goal of all organized societies. The pursuit of that goal cannot realistically
be confined within national boundaries. That has long been the case, but
it is increasingly evident today.... The trafficking in drugs, with which we
are here concerned, is an international enterprise and requires effective
tools of international cooperation for its investigation, prosecution and
suppression. Extradition is an important and well-established tool for
effecting this cooperation.62

Later in Cotroni, in the context of approving rendition under the Extradition Act as a justified violation of section 663 of the Charter, La Forest J.
invoked favourably an earlier statement of the Ontario Court of Appeal64
which sought to validate applying the Charter differently in the extradition context:
For well over one hundred years, extradition has been part of the fabric of
our law. Though this does not exempt it from Charter scrutiny,
nevertheless, as the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in ... Rauca ...: "the
Charter was not enacted in a vacuum and the rights set out therein must
be interpreted rationally having regard to the then existing laws and, in
the instant case, to the position which Canada occupies in the world and
the effective history of the multitude of extradition treaties it has had with
other nations."65

Another major point which drove the Court's extradition discourse was
that it necessarily involved executive function, and in particular that extradition was ultimately set within the federal government's conduct of foreign affairs and contained a political component which had to be incorporated into the process. As Professor Anne La Forest has written, "[i]t has
always been accepted that a significant objective of extradition is to ensure comity, reciprocity and respect [for the legal processes of other

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

United States v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 at para. 27 [Cotroni].
Ibid.
Protecting mobility rights of Canadian citizens.
In Re Federal Republic of Germany and Rauca (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 385 at 404.
Cotroni, supra note 61 at para. 40.
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states]."66 Concomitant with this was reluctance on the part of the Court to
be seen to be judging or evaluating foreign legal process. As noted in the
discussion above, it was consistently held that the Charter was not to be
applied so as to scrutinize the legal process to which the extradited
individual would become subject, as this would give the Charter extraterritorial effect.67 Indeed, Justice La Forest on occasion displayed actual
distaste for the idea:
The judicial process in a foreign country must not be subjected to finicky
evaluations against the rules governing the legal process in this country.
A judicial process is not, for example, fundamentally unjust — indeed it
may in its practical workings be as just as ours — because it functions on
the basis of an investigatory system without a presumption of innocence
or, generally, because its procedural or evidentiary safeguards have none
of the rigours of our system.68

Any suggestion that the requesting state might have human rights
standards which were in some respect deficient was to be treated very
carefully, since such a suggestion was "offensive to notions of comity and
'amounts to a serious adverse reflection... on foreign governments to whom
Canada has a treaty obligation.'"69 This view is consistent with what is
termed the "rule of non-inquiry" in extradition matters:70 that courts will
not inquire into the rule of law or level of human rights protection in the
requesting state, such matters being "best left to executive determination."71
The courts of the requesting state were to be "trust[ed] ... to give the fugitive a fair trial."72
At the same time, the Court has consistently spoken to the need for
Charter rights to be protected within the extradition context. As Justice La
Forest stated in Cotroni, extradition procedure is "tailored with an eye to
the liberty of the individual."73 Specifically, the Court must be engaged

66. La Forest, "The Balance Between Liberty and Comity," supra note 41 at 140.
67. United States v. Allard, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564 at 571; Schmidt, supra note 4 at 523.
68. Schmidt, ibid, at 522-523.
69. Sharon Williams, "Human Rights Safeguards and International Cooperation in Extradition:
Striking the Balance" in Albin Esen & Oto Lagodny, eds., Principles and Procedures for a New
Transnational Criminal Law (Freiburg: Max Planck Institute, 1992) 535 at 561, quoting Mellino,
supra note 4 at 555.
70. LA. Shearer, "Extradition and Human Rights" (1994) 68 Austl. L.J. 451 at 452. See generally
Gilbert, supra note 41 at 79-84; Richard J. Wilson, "Toward the Enforcement of Universal Human
Rights Through Abrogation of the Rule of Non-Inquiry in Extradition" (1997) 3 ILSA J. Int'l. &
Comp. L. 751.
71. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 37 at 189.
72. Schmidt, supra note 4 at 524.
73. Cotroni, supra note 61 at 1500; Schmidt, ibid, at 515.
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with the ultimate fate of the fugitive, and the appropriate lens was section
7 of the Charter, which:
... is concerned not only with the immediate consequences of an extradition
order but also with "the manner in which the foreign state will deal with
the fugitive on surrender, whether that course of conduct is justifiable or
not under the law of that country."74

While the legal process of the foreign state could not be C/zarfcr-tested,
the Minister's discretionary decision to surrender the individual was
subject to scrutiny under section 7 — the goal being to ensure that surrender was, in all the circumstances, in accordance with "the principles of
fundamental justice."
However, fundamental justice was different in this context, shaped as
it was by "the concepts of reciprocity, comity and respect for differences
in other jurisdictions."75 In the foundational 1987 decision of Schmidt, the
Court stated that the Minister's decision is to be given curial deference and
the courts must be "extremely circumspect" in interfering with a surrender
decision.76 For a surrender decision to be overturned, the conditions to be
faced by the individual in the requesting state must be dire: "where the
nature of the criminal procedures or penalties in a foreign country sufficiently shocks the conscience .. ,"77 Justice La Forest used as an example
a European Commission on Human Rights case78 where it was found that
the fugitive faced the possibility of torture upon rendition, but noted that
the conscience might be shocked in "[situations falling far short of this."79
The Court expanded on the "shocks the conscience" test in an
infamous pair of decisions released just a few years later, Kindler v. Canada
(Minister of Justice)*0 and Reference Re Ng Extradition?1 Both Kindler
and Ng were accused of horrific crimes, and both faced the death penalty

74. Suresh, supra note 7 at para. 56, quoting Schmidt, ibid, at 522.
75. Kindler, supra note 4 at para. 160. As Professor Morgan comments in an article written before
Burns, ".. .the post-Charter extradition cases display a reversal of roles from the primacy of constitutional rights to the submergence of those rights to the country's international obligations..." (Morgan, supra note 28 at 461).
76. Schmidt, supra note 4 at 523. However, the Court has recently noted that in this specific regard,
"much less deference is due on the issue of whether the Minister properly considered the fugitive's
constitutional rights ..." (UnitedStates v. Kwok, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 532 at 580) [Kwok].
77. Schmidt, ibid, at 522 [emphasis added]. See also United States v. Allard, supra note note 67, a
companion case to Schmidt and Mellino, where the language "simply unacceptable" was used (at 572).
78. Altun v. Germany (1983), 5 E.H.R.R. 611.
79. Schmidt, supra note 4 at 522.
80. Supra note 4.
81. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858.
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in the U.S. upon surrender (in Pennsylvania and California respectively).
In both cases, the Court refused to overturn the Minister's surrender orders.
In Kindler, the leading judgment of the two, the Court expanded upon
the use of the "shocks the conscience" test in assessing constitutionality of
surrender under section 7, in a passage worth setting out fully:
[T]he reviewing court must consider the offence for which the penalty
may be prescribed, as well as the nature of the justice system in the
requesting jurisdiction and the safeguards and guarantees it affords the
fugitive. Other considerations such as comity and security within Canada
may also be relevant to the decision to extradite and if so, on what
conditions. At the end of the day, the question is whether the provision or
action in question offends the Canadian sense of what is fair, right and
just, bearing in mind the nature of the offence and the penalty, the foreign
justice system and considerations of comity and security, and according
due latitude to the Minister to balance the conflicting considerations.
In determining whether, bearing all these factors in mind, the extradition
in question is "simply unacceptable", the judge must avoid imposing his
or her own subjective views on the matter, and seek rather to objectively
assess the attitudes of Canadians on the issue of whether the fugitive is
facing a situation which is shocking and fundamentally unacceptable to
our society.82

A certain perplexity greeted these judgments, given that they emerged from
a Court which just four years before (in Schmidt) had used the possibility
of torture as an example of a violation of section 7 sufficient to overturn a
surrender order, but was now refusing to do so with regard to the death
sentence. Both decisions were roundly criticized in fairly strong language;83
one learned commentator referred to Kindler, in particular, as "a blemish
on the Court."84 Ng's case, in fact, went to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee, which ruled85 that in extraditing Ng to face execution
by gas asphyxiation Canada had violated its obligations under article 7 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights?6 The conscience

82. Kindler at paras. 176-77.
83. See e.g. James W. O'Reilly, "Case Comment: Ng and Kindler" (1992) 37 McGill L.J. 873.
84. William A. Schabas, International Human Rights Law and the Canadian Charter, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 233, noting that the judgment was criticized soon after by the JCPC in
Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1993] 4 All E.R. 769.
85. Ng v. Canada (No. 469/1991), UN Doc. A/49/40, Vol. II, p. 189; 15 H.R.L.J. 149. Kindler's
petition was unsuccessful (Kindler v. Canada (No. 470/1991), UN Doc. A/48/40, Vol. II, p. 138; 14
H.R.L.J. 307.
86. 23 March 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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of many, it appeared, had been shocked.87
The state of the law remained unchanged for a decade, when the Court
abruptly reversed itself on the question of extraditing to face the death
penalty.88 The 2001-2002 period was something of a "banner year" for
Supreme Court of Canada and other appellate extradition cases, in that a
number of decisions were released that relieved the pall cast by Kindler
and Ng.B9 The most noteworthy is Burns, where the Court found that,
absent exceptional circumstances (which it declined to define), extradition to face execution will always infringe section 7, and the Minister is
constitutionally required to seek assurances from the requesting state that
the death penalty will not be imposed prior to surrender.90
Glen Burns and Atif Rafay were Canadian citizens who were accused
of the murder of Rafay's family in the state of Washington.91 Apprehended
in British Columbia by an RCMP sting operation,92 they were committed
for extradition to Washington by then-Justice Minister Allan Rock. While
it was open to the Minister under the relevant extradition treaty to seek
assurances from the U.S. government that the death penalty would not be
imposed, he declined to do so.93 The Respondents challenged the Minister's
decision on the basis that sections 6,7 and 12 of the Charter prohibited the
Minister from extradition without assurances in the circumstances.
The Court upheld the British Columbia Court of Appeal's direction of

87. The Human Rights Committee recently made a similar decision in the case of Roger Judge,
who was deported back to Pennsylvania's death row in 1998 (Judge v. Canada (No. 829/1998), U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998, decision date August 13, 2003).
88. Though, as pointed out by Professor Haigh, the Court chose merely to distinguish Kindler and
Ng on the basis of "changing conditions" affecting the section 7 evaluation, rather than overrule; see
his interesting discussion in Richard Haigh, "A Kindler, Gentler Supreme Court? The Case of Burns
and the Need for a Principled Approach to Overruling" (2001) 14 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 139.
89. Aside from Burns and Canada (Minister of Justice) v. Paciflcador (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 685
(C.A.) (leave to appeal dismissed, S.C.C. Bulletin, 2003, p. 286) [Paciflcador], dealt with below, see
also Kwok, supra note 76; United States v. Shulman, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 616; United States v. Cobb,
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 587 [Cobb]; United States v. Tsioubris, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 613. Cobb is perhaps the
most noteworthy of these, the Court finding that the extradition judge had the jurisdiction to dismiss
an extradition request for abuse of process, where U.S. authorities televised a threat to make Cobb
"the boyfriend of a very bad man" if he continued to exercise his procedural rights under Canadian
extradition law (para. 8).
90. At least, in those cases where, as here, the extradition treaty specifically provides for assurances; the Court specifically declined comment on cases where there was no such clause in the treaty
(Burns, supra note 6 at para. 139).
91. The specific allegation was that Rafay had engaged Burns as a "contract killer" to dispose of
his family so that he could collect the proceeds of their estates and life insurance benefit; Burns was
to receive a portion of the money.
92. Which apparently produced confessions from both (Burns, supra note 6 at paras. 10-11).
93. Ibid., para. 19.
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the Minister to seek assurances prior to surrendering Burns and Rafay.94
In so doing, it re-affirmed that such decisions were properly made under
section 7, as "[t]he death penalty is overwhelmingly a justice issue"95 and
thus the fundamental principles of justice were engaged. It rejected the
applicability of section 6 mobility rights, which had formed the basis of
the Court of Appeal's decision, and also rejected the respondents' argument that the section 12 prohibition against cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment should prevent the surrender, an argument previously rejected
by the La Forest Court in Kindler and Ng.96
Specifically, the Court re-affirmed the applicability of its Kindler
balancing test, in particular the "shocks the conscience" standard, which it
stated was "intended to underline the very exceptional nature of circumstances that would constitutionally limit the Minister's discretion in extradition cases."97 It continued:
Use of the "shocks the conscience" terminology was intended to convey
the exceptional weight of a factor such as the youth, insanity, mental
retardation or pregnancy of a fugitive which, because of its paramount
importance, may control the outcome of the Kindler balancing test on the
facts of a particular case. The terminology should not be allowed to obscure
the ultimate assessment that is required: namely whether or not the
extradition is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
The rule is not that departures from fundamental justice are to be tolerated
unless in a particular case it shocks the conscience. An extradition that
violates the principles of fundamental justice will always shock the
conscience. The important inquiry is to determine what constitutes the
applicable principles of fundamental justice in the extradition context.
The "shocks the conscience" language signals the possibility that even
though the rights of the fugitive are to be considered in the context of
other applicable principles of fundamental justice, which are normally of
sufficient importance to uphold the extradition, a particular treatment or
punishment may sufficiently violate our sense of fundamental justice as
to tilt the balance against extradition. Examples might include stoning to
death individuals taken in adultery, or lopping off the hands of a thief.
The punishment is so extreme that it becomes the controlling issue in the
extradition and overwhelms the rest of the analysis.98

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

United States v. Burns [Re Minister's Warrants] (1997), 94 B.C.A.C. 59.
Burns, supra note 6 at para. 48.
See discussion of this below.
Burns, supra note 6 at para. 67.
Ibid, at paras. 68-69.
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The Court expanded upon exactly how the punishment, in this case, did
"overwhelm the analysis," and ultimately rested its decision on its finding
that both domestic and international perception of the death
penalty had changed since Kindler and Ng were decided. In particular, the
Court appeared to find influential the increased profile of wrongful
convictions in the Canadian and American justice systems. It also noted
that many states now seek assurances in death penalty cases as a matter of
course, and that assurances were routinely granted: "there is little indication that U.S. governments would ever refuse such guarantees."99
A possible indication of what the heritage of Burns will be became
apparent in the Ontario Court of Appeal's recent decision in Canada (Minister of Justice) v. Pacificador.m Pacificador was a Philippine national
who was caught on the wrong side of the divide during that country's revolution in 1980s, and was accused of various offences in the Philippines
arising out of a political assassination in 1986. During the course of a
ten-year extradition process,101 Pacificador submitted a considerable record
of convincing evidence that he was facing what could only be described as
a "kangaroo court" should he be extradited, including serious potential for
indefinite pre-trial detention and denial of bail. The Minister, having sought
and received assurances from the Philippine government that Pacificador
would have a speedy trial upon his return, ordered his surrender.
In a fairly terse judgment setting aside the Minister's surrender order,
the Court of Appeal stitched together a precis of how section 7 should be
applied to surrender orders, utilizing passages from Schmidt, Kindler and
Burns.102 Significantly, it was able to avail itself of a less deferential
standard of review, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's statements
in Kwokm that, unlike a truly prosecutorial decision by the Minister, '"much
less deference' is required for ministerial decisions concerning the violation of constitutional rights."104 It reviewed the evidence that Pacificador
had led to the effect that some of his co-accuseds in the same matter had
been imprisoned without bail since 1989, as well as a number of other
matters. In particular, the Court was disturbed by the Minister's reliance
upon assurances by the Philippine government that their courts would
afford Pacificador due process upon his return, since these assurances were

99. Ibid, at para. 138.
100. Supra note 89.
101. The Court notes that the potential for extraditing Pacificador was what motivated the government of the Philippines to strike an extradition treaty with Canada in the first place (ibid., para. 7).
102. Ibid., paras. 44-46.
103. Supra note 76.
104. Pacificador, supra note 89 at para. 43.
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demonstrably "unpersuasive and unreliable."105 In the end, the evidence
established "[a]t the very least, ... a significant risk that the appellant will
not be fairly treated upon his surrender,"106 since there had already been
"serious violations of the fundamental right to trial within a reasonable
time and the fundamental right not to be held indefinitely in custody
without bail."107 The Court concluded with a brief summary of the law as
developed:
Ministerial decisions assessing the appropriate balance between the rights
of the individual and the considerations favouring surrender are entitled
to curial deference. Extradition is based upon principles of comity and
mutual cooperation and respect between states. Extradition plays a vital
role in the international community's effort to fight crime and to ensure
those accused of serious wrongdoing are brought to trial. On the other
hand, these important values are subject to the rights guaranteed by the
Charter. Where an individual establishes that he or she would face a
situation that would be "simply unacceptable" or that would "shock the
conscience", a s. 7 claim has been established and a Ministerial surrender
order must be set aside.108

The order was set aside, and the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to
appeal shortly thereafter.109
4. Charter Application to Deportation: Suresh
The Suresh case110 was released (along with three companion cases including Ahanim) early in 2002, just months after the events of September 11,
2001, and found the Court delicately stepping around transnational crime
issues in the wake of the political climate change wrought by that event.112

105. Ibid, at para. 50, followed by the following: "This, combined with the fact that the cause of the
unconscionable delay is the unexplained order of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, seriously
undermines the respondent's argument that the appellant should be surrendered on the faith the
Minister expressed in the Philippines' justice system."
106. Ibid, at para. 53.
107. Ibid, at para. 54.
108. Ibid, at para. 55.
109. S.C.C. Bulletin, 2003, p. 286.
110. Supra note 7.
111. Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 208 D.L.R. (4th) 57, 2002
SCC 2. For a comment see Joanna Harrington, "Punting Terrorists, Assassins and Other Undesirables: Canada, the Human Rights Committee and Requests for Interim Measures of Protection"
(2003) 48 McGill L.J. 55.
112. See generally Ronald J. Daniels et al, eds., The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's AntiTerrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); David M. Paciocco, "Constitutional
Casualties of September 11: Limiting the Legacy of the Anti-Terrorism Act" (2002) 16 Sup. Ct. L.
Rev. (2d) 185.
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Suresh was a Convention refugee from Sri Lanka, who had initially
supported his refugee status in Canada by claiming that he would face
torture if sent back, specifically from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LITE, the "Tamil Tigers"). As it turned out, the government was able to
collect what the Court perceived to be fairly compelling evidence that he
was, in fact, a member of the group, and was in Canada for the purpose of
fundraising for it.
The Department of Immigration and Citizenship sought to deport Suresh
as a terrorist fundraiser. He then adduced at least aprima facie case that he
would be tortured by the Sri Lankan government if he was deported. While
a number of important administrative law issues were raised by the case,113
it is worthy of review here because one of the most important issues the
Court was facing was virtually the same as in Burns: could Canada deport
a person to face torture in another country?114
In terms of application of the Charter, the Court found that deportation
is ultimately indistinguishable from extradition, and in fact simply inserted
the Burns analysis into this context. This included the entire section 7
analysis as laid out in Schmidt, Kindler and Burns, since "the governing
principle [is] a general one — namely, that the guarantee of fundamental
justice applies even to deprivations of life, liberty or security effected by
actors other than our government, if there is a sufficient causal connection
between our government's participation and the deprivation ultimately
effected."115
Consistently with Burns, the Court concluded that a proper application
of section 7 would preclude deportation to face torture "barring extraordinary circumstances."116 Finding a strong presumption against torture in
both domestic and international law, it ruled that "insofar as the Immigration Act leaves open the possibility of deportation to torture, the Minister
should generally decline to deport refugees where on the evidence there is
a substantial risk of torture."117 The Court left open the possibility that

113. For commentary see, inter alia, David Dyzenhaus, "Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law" (2002) 27 Queen's LJ. 445, paras. 124-132; David W. Elliott,
"Suresh and the Common Borders of Administrative Law: Time for the Tailor?" (2002) 65 Sask. L.
Rev. 469; Peter J. Carver, "Shelter From the Storm: A Comment on Suresh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration)" (2002) 40 Alta. L. Rev. 465; Lome Sossin, "Developments in Administrative Law: the 2001-2002 Term" (2003) 18 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 41.
114. Though the Court's discussion of this issue in Suresh could formally be characterized as obiter
dicta, since a new hearing for Suresh was ordered on procedural grounds (Suresh, supra note 7 at
para. 27).
115. Ibid., para. 54.
116. Ibid., para. 76.
117. Ibid., para. 77.
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such deportation might be justified "in exceptional circumstances... either
as a consequence of the balancing process mandated by s. 7 of the Charter
or under s. I."118
5. To Close the Open Door
Clearly, Burns, Pacificador and Suresh bode well for the future. Burns
demonstrates an enlightened approach to the death penalty, one commensurate with what I and others hope is the inexorable movement towards
abolition, retentionist U.S. states notwithstanding.119 Suresh contained explicit condemnation of the practice of torture, emphasizing its illegality at
international law and its inconsistency with Canadian principles of fundamental justice. Pacificador gave some indication of how effectively the
new Kindler/Burns test can work in cases where human rights violations
short of official execution are at play, insofar as the Court reviewed a fairly
intense evidentiary record and properly found that the "shocking" facts of
the case rendered the Minister's decision to extradite unconstitutional.
Intriguingly, the latter case turned on the Court's finding that ministerial reliance upon diplomatic communication from a treaty partner was an
error, specifically because the assurances provided by the foreign government were themselves unreliable. This seems a bit out of step with the La
Forest Court's earlier, scrupulous avoidance of "finicky evaluations" of
the foreign process120 and its unwillingness to interfere with inter-state
reliance and communications which, after all, are executive and political
matters.121 It would also seem to undermine the strength of a Crown
submission the Court appeared to have considered favourably in Burns,
that "[t]he Minister points out that Canada satisfies itself that certain minimum standards of criminal justice exist in the foreign state before it makes
an extradition treaty in the first place."122
In both Burns and Suresh, however, the Supreme Court displays what

118. Ibid., para. 78.
119. See generally Willliam A. Schabas, Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 3d ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and "Indirect Abolition: Capital Punishment's Role
in Extradition Law and Practice" (2003) 25 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 581. For some interesting insights, see Timothy V Kaufman-Osborn, From Noose to Needle: Capital Punishment and the
Late Liberal State (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).
120. Per Schmidt, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
121. What is interesting as well is that the Court of Appeal refers to the rights to trial within a
reasonable time and to protection against indefinite imprisonment without trial as "fundamental."
While this is certainly consistent with Canadian law and international human right standards generally, it does smack of the kind of evaluation of foreign legal process which the La Forest Court had
spoken against.
122. Burns, supra note 6 at para. 73.
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in my view is a disturbing reluctance to completely foreclose the rendition
of individuals to face execution or torture. In Burns the Court was careful
to state that "the Charter... does not lay down a constitutional prohibition
in all cases against extradition unless assurances are given that the death
penalty will not be imposed."123 The more chilling passage, perhaps,
occurs later in the Court's reasons:
[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that there may be situations where
the Minister's objectives are so pressing, and where there is no other way
to achieve those objectives other than through extradition without
assurances, that a violation might be justified. In this case, we find no
such justification.124

Similar language appeared in Suresh, the Court ruling that deportation to
torture could on some limited facts be consistent with the principles of
fundamental justice in the deportation context per section 7 of the Charter,
or justified by the state as a reasonable limitation under section I. 125
In effect, the Court has said there can be circumstances in which rendition of an individual to face the death penalty or torture will be acceptable.
While in these two cases rendition would have "shocked the conscience,"
and it would appear that this would usually be so, there will be situations
where packing someone off to be killed or tortured will be acceptable —
all of the Court's rather well-placed concern about wrongful convictions,
international norms, Canadian constitutional principles and the "death row
phenomenon"126 notwithstanding. It is this qualification that gives pause,
this drawing of the line somewhere short of absolute protection. The Charter
protects individuals, but only so far; at some point beyond our borders,
imposition of the death penalty or torture may be "shocking" but nonetheless necessary.
It should be stated that despite the passage of new legislation, all of
these concerns will continue to be relevant under the new Extradition Act.121
Notably, section 44 of the new Act reads as follows:
44.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

(1) The Minister shall refuse to make a surrender order if the Minister
is satisfied that

Ibid., para. 8.
Ibid.,pam. 133.
Supra note 118 and accompanying text.
Burns, supra note 6 at paras. 118-123.
Supra note 43.
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(a) the surrender would be unjust or oppressive having regard
to all the relevant circumstances; or
(b) the request for extradition is made for the purpose of
prosecuting or punishing the person by reason of their race,
religion, nationality, ethnic origin, language, colour, political
opinion, sex, sexual orientation, age, mental or physical
disability or status or that the person's position may be
prejudiced for any of those reasons
(2) The Minister may refuse to make a surrender order if the Minister
is satisfied that the conduct in respect of which the request for
extradition is made is punishable by death under the laws that apply
to the extradition partner.128

The Minister shall refuse to surrender on the basis of discrimination, but
may refuse to surrender on the basis that the fugitive faces the death
sentence — there is a certain dissonance to this dichotomy. Similarly, section 46 compels the Minister to refuse surrender, inter alia, if the offence
in question is military or political. Admittedly, section 44(1 )(a) leaves open
the possibility of refusing surrender where it would be "unjust or oppressive" in all the circumstances, to which Burns and the "shocks the
conscience" test would appear to apply. It has been suggested that this
clause could be applied to situations involving the mental illness of the
fugitive, "oppressive" mandatory minimum jail sentences or inhumane
conditions in foreign jails; however, even the authors of these suggestions
have modest expectations in this regard.129
Expectations should not be modest. The Charter protects individuals from inhumane treatment at the hands of Canada's governments, and it
should do no less for individuals whom Canada is considering extraditing
or deporting. The Canadian government should not be a participant of any
sort in a gross violation of human rights by another state, in particular to
the extent of the rendition of an individual to face this sort of treatment
abroad. The language, spirit and letter of the Charter demand this. The
fact that it is not the Canadian government itself that will carry out the
violation, which (as discussed below) the Supreme Court has found to be
significant, is of no moment. By any sensible legal analysis, sending someone off to meet their doom in another country makes the sending state one
of the authors of that doom.

128. Ibid., s. 44.
129. See Krivel et al., supra note 44 at 342-49.
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It should be made clear that the concern here is not with every possible
avenue of treatment that the extraditee/deportee might meet in the requesting state. "Gross human rights violations" as used here refers to the
extreme forms of what section 12 of the Charter calls "cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment." The death sentence clearly qualifies, and some
others can be identified by their status as, arguably, jus cogens prohibitions at international law: torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment and punishment;130 slavery;131 and racial discrimination.132 There is some consensus that freedom from retroactive criminal
laws qualifies,133 and imprisonment without trial would also seem so given
the result in Pacificador.
The argument here is that, by employing section 7 of the Charter as the
analytical focus, the Court has put in place a balancing exercise that gives
undue weight to the state's interest in international criminal co-operation,
at the potential expense of fundamental human rights norms. As will be
suggested, the Court's reason for employing section 7 rather than section
12 where gross human rights violations are concerned is difficult to
justify. A properly-framed section 12 analysis, applied where it is
appropriate to do so, would be an effective adjunct to the current approach
and prevent Canadian complicity in gross human rights violations.
6. Revisiting the Application of Section 7
The Supreme Court has recently re-stated its formula for determining the
principles of fundamental justice under section 7, and while this restatement occurred after Burns and Suresh it is still an informative lens for this
discussion. In R. v. Malmo-Levine,134 the Court quoted its holding in Re
B.C. Motor Vehicle Act135 that the principles of fundamental justice:
... lie in "the basic tenets of our legal system. They do not lie in the realm

130. Particularly if one looks to the argument that the Torture Convention, ((1987) 1465 U.N.T.S.
85) with its prohibition on extradition to face torture (Art. 3(1)), enjoys customary international law
status. Accord, Keith Carmichael, Fiona McKay, "Law Reform: US and UK Remedies for Torture
Committed Abroad" (1997) 2 Int'l Bar Assoc. Human Rts. Inst. News 14 at 15; Dugard & Van den
Wyngaert, supra note 37 at 198-202.
131. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998) at 515.
132. Brownlie, ibid. On this point, see s. 44 of the Extradition Act, supra note 43.
133. Accord, Christopher H.W. Gane, "Human Rights and International Cooperation in Criminal
Matters," in Peter J. Cullen & William C. Gilmore, eds., Crime Sans Frontieres: International and
European Legal Approaches (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998) 168.
134. [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 2003 SCC 74 [Malmo-Levine].
135. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
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of general public policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as
guardian of the justice system".... This Court provided further guidance
as to what constitutes a principle of fundamental justice for the purposes
of s. 7, in Rodriguez, supra, per Sopinka J. (at pp. 590-91 and 607):
A mere common law rule does not suffice to constitute a principle
of fundamental justice, rather, as the term implies, principles upon
which there is some consensus that they are vital or fundamental
to our societal notion of justice are required. Principles of
fundamental justice must not, however, be so broad as to be no
more than vague generalizations about what our society considers
to be ethical or moral. They must be capable of being identified
with some precision and applied to situations in a manner which
yields an understandable result. They must also, in my view, be
legal principles.
While the principles of fundamental justice are concerned with
more than process, reference must be made to principles which
are "fundamental" in the sense that they would have general
acceptance among reasonable people.136

It then laid out the three criteria for acceptance as a "principle of fundamental justice," which it subsequently re-stated in Canadian Foundation
for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General)137 as
follows:
Jurisprudence on s. 7 has established that a "principle of fundamental
justice" must fulfill three criteria:... First, it must be a legal principle.
This serves two purposes. First, it provides meaningful content for the s.
7 guarantee"; second, it avoids the "adjudication of policy matters"...
Second, there must be sufficient consensus that the alleged principle is
"vital or fundamental to our societal notion of justice":... The principles
of fundamental justice are the shared assumptions upon which our system
of justice is grounded. They find their meaning in the cases and traditions
that have long detailed the basic norms for how the state deals with its
citizens. Society views them as essential to the administration of justice.
Third, the alleged principle must be capable of being identified with
precision and applied to situations in a manner that yields predictable
results.138

136. Malmo-Levine, supra note 134 at para. 112 [emphasis in original].
137. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 2004 SCC 4.
138. Ibid, at para. 8, citations omitted.
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To determine the content of the section 7 right in Burns, the Court reached
into its previous extradition jurisprudence for some of the "basic tenets of
the legal system" which constitute the fundamental principles of justice in
the extradition setting, including: accused individuals should be brought
to trial; justice is best served by a trial in the jurisdiction where the crime
was committed; individuals who leave Canada leave behind Canadian law
and procedure and are subject to those, including punishment, of the
foreign state; "that extradition is based on the principles of comity and
fairness to other cooperating states in rendering mutual assistance in bringing fugitives to justice...; subject to the principle that the fugitive must...
receive a fair trial in the requesting state...."139 Interestingly, these
factors were presented as "Factors that Arguably Favour Extradition
Without Assurances." It then cited "Countervailing Factors that Arguably
Favour Extradition Only with Assurances", among them the abolition of
the death penalty in Canada and in most other democracies, international
practice regarding extradition with assurances, personal circumstances of
the fugitive, and particularly national and international concerns regarding wrongful convictions.140
These, said the Court, were the factors to be balanced, and given the
high level of discretion which should be accorded the Minister, only a
balance which produced a "shock to the conscience" would justify
overturning a surrender order. This explicitly upheld the Kindler test and
the idea that "the rights of the fugitive are to be considered in the context
of other applicable principles of fundamental justice, which are normally
of sufficient importance to uphold the extradition."141 It is perhaps
noteworthy how much in the way of very modern developments were found
to be fundamental principles; that new developments were held to constitute shared assumptions, to be basic norms that attracted consensus that
they are essential for the purposes of the second part of the Malmo-Levine/
Canadian Foundation principles. This is remarkable in that it was upon
these principles that the Court justified its shift from the way the balancing
exercise was done in Ng and Kindler, which may reflect something of a
sea change from the La Forest Court's extradition jurisprudence.
Again, this is a positive development. However, it was this same
balancing test that produced the results in Ng and Kindler to begin with. It
is the "shocks the conscience" test, I submit, which is part of the problem.
Recall the passages from Kindler set out above, wherein the Court noted

139. Burns, supra note 6 at para. 72, citations omitted.
140. Ibid, at paras. 75-123.
141. Ibid, at para. 69.
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that assessing such shock requires a consideration of "the Canadian sense
of what is fair, right and just"; a judge "must avoid imposing his or her
own subjective views on the matter, and seek rather to objectively assess
the attitudes of Canadians on the issue of whether the fugitive is facing a
situation which is shocking and fundamentally unacceptable to our society." The Court tried to backtrack on this in Burns, noting that "the phrase
'shocks the conscience' and equivalent expressions are not to be taken out
of context or equated to opinion polls."142 The suggestion remains, however, that something besides pure constitutional values must play a part in
the matrix. This must be so, since punishment which clearly would be
"shocking" if carried out domestically143 is not so shocking when carried
out by a foreign country.
It all comes down to this: "[t]he important inquiry is to determine what
constitutes the applicable principles of fundamental justice in the extradition context."144 The "shocks the conscience" standard, then, is tightly linked
to the fundamental principles of justice as mandated by section 7 of the
Charter, but just as clear is that these principles are not immutable (though
death, I would note, is).145 The Court has been explicit that the fundamental principles of justice are distinct in the extradition context because of
the competing considerations of international comity and respect for the
legal systems of treaty partners. Our concerns about sending an individual
off to be killed, or tortured, or indefinitely imprisoned without process,
have to be balanced against our relations with other states and similar
political considerations (including the very valid and important consideration of combating transnational crime). Similar balancing was at play in
Suresh.
There is, I submit, too much balancing and too much use of context in
section 7. Note that this, the Kindler/Ng "balancing approach" which al-

142. Ibid, at para. 67. Similarly, in Suresh, supra note 7, the Court stated that the phrase should be
interpreted "fwjithout resorting to opinion polls, which may vary with the mood of the moment"
(para. 49).
143. Though the Court has never authoritatively pronounced on the constitutionality of the death
sentence, and specifically refused to do so in Burns (para. 78). However, the balance of opinion
suggests that it would violate section 12; see e.g. Hogg, supra note 12 at 50-12. See also the dissenting reasons of Cory J. in Kindler, supra note 4 at para. 94.
144. Burns, supra note 6 at para. 68.
145. For example, the Court justified the differences in result between Kindler and Burns by suggesting that concern with wrongful convictions was now so prominent that it, in part, dictated a
different result in a death penalty case. Yet would not the same thing apply even if the death sentence was not on the table? Is not incarceration of the innocent just as repugnant as execution of the
innocent? Would wrongful convictions play a part in a torture case? The topic did not come up in
Pacificador.
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lowed extradition to face execution only ten years before, takes place within
the context of section 7 itself, rather than occurring as part of a section 1
justification.146 Accordingly, if a particular punishment in a particular state
is not too out of step with the principles of fundamental justice (diluted as
they are by comity considerations), then Canada need not justify extradition as a reasonable limit on the right not to be deprived of life, liberty or
security of person — since there is no violation. More tellingly, as one
commentator has suggested:
Post-Burns, the "shocks the conscience" test is turned on its head. It will
be relevant only if an extradition with assurances would shock the public
conscience, say, for example, if Osama bin Laden was discovered in
Canada, and the United States requested his extradition to stand trial for
the recent terrorist attacks in that country on September 11, 2001. The
refusal by the Minister of Justice in those circumstances to decline
extradition unless assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed
by the government of the United States, surely would shock the conscience
of the Canadian public.147

The problem lies in the Supreme Court's approach to section 7, which
has been one of balancing contextual factors. Several commentators over
the years have called for a return to the Court's initial approach to section
7, where the right was defined in terms of the individual interest being
protected rather than being balanced with state interests.148 As Professor
Stuart has commented:
On this approach, the state objectives are only to be considered if there is
a violation and the state is attempting to demonstrably justify a reasonable
limit under s. 1. A balancing of interest at the first stage will considerably
dilute the protection of the Charter since the state will not have to bear
the heavy onus of justification under s. I.149

146. Bredt and Dodek refer to this as "the triumph of internal balancing over section 1 external
balancing": Christopher P. Bredt & Adam M. Dodek, "The Increasing Irrelevance of Section 1 of the
Charter" (2001) 14 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 175 at 183.
147. Graeme G. Mitchell, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 2000-2001 Term—The
McLachlin Era Begins" (2001) 15 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 99 at 151-52. While the comment is relevant, it will be clear in the present context that I endorse neither its validity nor its casting of the
"shocks the conscience" test.
148. Morris Manning, "Lyons: A One-Stage Approach to the Charter and Undue 'Constitutional
Notice"' (1987), 61 C.R. (3d) 72; Thomas J. Singleton, "The Principles of Fundamental Justice,
Societal Interests and Section 1 of the Charter" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 446.
149. Stuart, supra note 2 at 57.
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While I would not necessarily argue that the current approach to section 7
should be thrown out in every legal context, the specific linking of the fate
of the individual with other state-oriented contextual factors does "dilute
the protection of the Charter" in this setting, and moreover deprives the
Oakes test for section 1 justification of the violation of most of its content.
This is demonstrated most clearly by the fact that in both Burns and Suresh
the Court dealt with section 1 in an almost perfunctory manner. In Burns
in particular (where the section 1 test was actually applied) it is difficult to
distinguish the "balancing factors" the Minister offered under section 7
(most notably "principles of comity and fairness to other cooperating states
in rendering mutual assistance") from the justificatory factors it offered
under section 1 ("advancing mutual assistance in the fight against crime").150
Suresh, too, saw the "fundamental principles of justice" re-balanced,
this time against the danger the deportee represents to Canada, and
"Canada's interest in combatting terrorism."151 The malevolent power of
the section 7 analysis was demonstrated in Suresh, as it permitted the Court
to instruct itself (and the lower courts) that the fundamental human right
not to be subjected to torture — a jus cogens principle of international
law152— was to be subjected to a contextual approach and put through a
wringer of "balancing factors."
This, then, is the most troubling aspect of the Burns analysis: it allows
for contextual balancing at the "alleged violation" stage of Charter litigation, rather than the "justification" stage, where it properly belongs. By
treating the possibility of torture as but one contextualized factor of many
(most importantly international comity) which are subsumed under "fundamental principles of justice," the state formally has two opportunities to
justify the gross violation of human rights which will follow deportation.
It may argue that its decision to deport does not violate section 7 (in which
case, this individual's right to fundamental justice will not be violated by
deporting him/her), or there will be a violation of section 7 and the state
will get a second opportunity at the section 1 stage. Moreover, since the
significant part of the balancing is done under section 7, then section 1
will be something of an empty vessel.
The distribution of burden is also troubling. The party alleging a violation of section 7 bears the burden of satisfying the court to this effect on
a balance of probabilities,153 a burden which must be made a great deal

150.
151.
152.
153.

As Professor Hogg has pointed out, this is not unusual (Hogg, supra note 12 at 35-43).
Suresh, supra note 7 at para. 47.
Kindred et al, supra note 14 at 741, n. 1.
R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. Bernshaw, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 254.
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more difficult for a potential deportee who is compelled to make a case
that persuasively "balances" his/her own circumstances against the current state vision of security and the limits which must be placed on combating terrorism. We are left with the problematic nature of the way the
section 7 balancing test is currently applied: "[t]he balancing test becomes
both the means of establishing a constitutional standard applicable to all
cases, and the means of assessing the circumstances in individual cases."154
Suresh also repeats the same qualification with which it ended its
judgment in Burns, that deportation to torture would be unconstitutional
(i.e., that it would "shock the conscience") in all but "exceptional circumstances" which it confirms could be found in either the section 7 or section
1 analysis.155 At the time of writing there is still a vacuum regarding what
such circumstances would look like, though the Court does speak in Suresh
to how different the "relevant circumstances" (i.e., those circumstances
relevant to the Minister's deportation decision) are going to be in torture
cases. For example, no state in the world admits that it tortures people, or
at least that the torture is officially sanctioned or legal.156 As a result, the
Court suggests that the government of Canada must be careful about
following assurances that it gets from some states that a deportee will not
be tortured, noting that such factors as the state's human rights record and
evidence regarding whether and how well the government controls
security forces which might commit torture will be relevant.157 This is
encouragingly similar to remarks made by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Pacificador, though as Professor Carver points out, the difference remains
between relevant circumstances that shape the Minister's decision to
extradite or deport and exceptional circumstances that might justify extradition or deportation despite the relevanfcircumstances.158
7. A New Approach: Apply Section 12, Re-invigorate Section 1
There is an alternative route of analysis, one which the Court dealt with in
both Kindler and Burns but has consistently refused to apply: treat the
potential circumstances being faced by the fugitive in the requesting state

154. Carver, supra note 113 at 481-82.
155. It seems ironic that this dictum should emanate from a Supreme Court purporting to be toughening up the "shocks the conscience" standard as laid down by the La Forest Court in Kindler and
Ng, given that it was rendition to face torture that Justice La Forest himself used as the best example
of a situation which would "shock the conscience" (Schmidt, supra note 4 at 522).
156. Suresh, supra note 7 at para. 63, citing in particular the submissions of Amnesty International,
which intervened in the case.
157. Ibid, at paras. 124-125.
158. Carver, supra note 113 at paras. 482-83.
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as engaging the prohibition on cruel and unusual treatment or punishment
in section 12 of the Charter. Writing for himself and Lamer C. J. in Kindler,
Justice Cory emphasized "[t]he commitment of the international community to human dignity and the trend of western nations to abolish the death
penalty [which] parallels Canada's own international stance" in arriving at
the conclusion that extradition to face execution would violate section 12.159
It was clear that "[c]apital punishment isperse cruel and unusual,"160 and
would be a violation of section 12 if done in Canada. Justice Cory
reviewed European jurisprudence on the subject, particularly the case of
Soering v. United Kingdom,161 where the European Court of Human Rights
found that extraditing a fugitive to face the "death row phenomenon"
constituted a violation of state obligations under Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (the parallel provision to section 12 of the
Charter). Liability in the constitutional sense would inure to the extraditing state "by reason of its having taken action which has as a direct
consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment."162
Ultimately, Justice Cory presented cogent reasons that a state which
extradited a fugitive to face the death penalty was complicit in violation of
the section 12 right, even though its actual execution (so to speak) would

159. Kindler, para. 58.
160. Ibid, at para. 94. His Lordship was not specific as to whether extraditing to face the death
penalty constituted "treatment" or "punishment" under section 12. He did refer to the European
description of it as "treatment" (para. 107), but later appeared to suggest that it was "punishment"
(para. 119). In any event, this is not a serious sticking point, since if extradition or deportation are
not exactly "punishment" they surely fall under any reasonable definition of "treatment." The
Supreme Court held in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 [Rodriguez] that
"[t]here must be some more active state process in operation, involving an exercise of state control
over the individual, in order for the state action in question, whether it be positive action, inaction or
prohibition, to constitute 'treatment' under s. 12" (at para. 182), which would appear to settle
the issue.
161. Soeringv. United Kingdom, Series A, No. 161 (1989). Similar findings were made by the U.N.
Human Rights Committee in Ng v. Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991, and by the Supreme
Court of the Netherlands in The Netherlands v. Short, reprinted in (1990) 291.L.M. 1375. The Soering
case gave rise to a provision in the European Union's new Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (Dec. 18, 2000), online: http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/
default_en.htm (date visited: July 28, 2004)) that "no one may be removed, expelled or extradited to
a state where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty" (Art.
19(2)).
162. Soering, ibid, at 36. Exploration of the trend towards holding states liable for complicity in the
violation of human rights by other states (when the first state has been involved in some manner) is
beyond the current scope, but see generally Nihal Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human
Rights Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), especially 265-69; Ved P. Nanda, "Bases
for Refusing International Extradition Requests — Capital Punishment and Torture" (2000) 23
Fordham Int'l L.J. 1369; Mark W. Janis et al, European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials, 2d
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 125-137.
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take place outside Canada's jurisdiction:
[T]he respondent's contention that the Charter would not apply to cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted by the requesting state must be rejected.
In my view, since the death penalty is a cruel punishment, that argument
is an indefensible abdication of moral responsibility. Historically such a
position has always been condemned. The ceremonial washing of his hands
by Pontius Pilate did not relieve him of responsibility for the death sentence
imposed by others and has found little favour over the succeeding centuries.
Notwithstanding the fact that it is the United States and not Canada which
would impose the death penalty, Canada has the obligation not to extradite
a person to face a cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. To surrender
a fugitive who may be subject to the death penalty violates s. 12 of the
Charter just as surely as would the execution of the fugitive in Canada.163
Justice Cory's perspective hearkens back to that expressed by Justice
Wilson in Schmidt, where she wrote "[t]he effect is right here in Canada,
in the Canadian proceedings, although it will, of course, have repercussions abroad. But there is nothing wrong in this."164 Professor Morgan's
explanation of this perspective is illuminating:
The issue for Justice Wilson, in other words, was not so much whether the
Canadian constitutional ruling would give the Charter of Rights
extraterritorial effect, but rather whether the extradition treaty on which
the proceedings were founded could legally trump the constitutional
restraints imposed on the very government that entered the treaty in the
first place. Of paramount importance was not the cooperation of the
Canadian authorities with their American counterparts in bringing the
fugitive to justice; instead, the focus was on the cooperation of the Canadian
courts with their own governing and supreme constitutional norms.165
The majority in Kindler, however, declined to follow both Justice Cory's
reasoning and the Soering principle. Justice La Forest wrote: "The
Minister's actions do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The

163. Kindler, supra note 4 at paras. 108-109. In finding that the violation of section 12 was not
justified under section 1, Justice Cory remarked, in part: "Canada cannot, on the one hand, give an
international commitment to support the abolition of the death penalty and at the same time extradite
a fugitive without seeking the very assurances contemplated by the Treaty. To do so would mean
that Canada either was not honouring its international commitments or was applying one standard to
the United States and another to other nations. Neither alternative is acceptable. Both would contravene Canadian values and commitments" (para. 118).
164. Schmidt, supra note 4 at 532.
165. Morgan, supra note 28 at 453.
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execution, if it ultimately takes place, will be in the United States under
American law against an American citizen in respect of an offence that
took place in the United States."166 Justice McLachlin cautioned against
extraterritorial application of the Charter, and confirmed Justice La Forest's
view: "the effect of any Canadian law or government act is too remote
from the possible imposition of the penalty complained of to attract the
attention of s. 12."167 The majority did repeat its earlier holding from
Schmidt, among other decisions, that the values underlying section 12 are
of relevance in determining the content of section 7, which Professor
Schabas has called "a reasoning that borders on tautology."168 This entire
analysis of section 12 was re-affirmed in Burns without much additional
comment, except to emphasize once again the "remoteness" of extradition
from the execution.169
With respect, this point is not convincing.170 Simply applying a basic
tort or criminal law analysis to the act of extradition in Kindler, for
example, produces the inescapable conclusion that Canada, as the extraditing state, was an actor in his ultimate execution. As the Court itself
concedes in Burns, a decision to extradite would be "a necessary link in
the chain of causation."171 To torture the tort analogy even further, the
response from the Court is that sending the fugitive off to face a potential
death sentence is "too remote" from the actual carrying out of the death
sentence itself. Yet we know that a tortious action is not too remote for
liability purposes if it exposes the victim to foreseeable consequences —
even on the more conservative Wagon Mound No. 1 standard, where one
would have to be able to foresee the exact harm.172 So what kind of remoteness is the Court talking about? Certainly in the Judge case, the UN
Human Rights Committee was prepared to note that by deporting Judge to
death row, "Canada established the crucial link in the causal chain that
would make possible [his] execution."173 This is hardly a radical approach,

166. Kindler, supra note 4 at para. 126.
167. Ibid, at para. 169 [emphasis added].
168. Schabas, supra note 84 at 202.
169. Burns, supra note 6 at paras. 50-57.
170. Accord, Macintosh, supra note 40 at 176: "There is no bright line between application of
section 7 and section 12 in the extradition context and the underlying rationale for the different
treatment remains difficult to discern."
171. Burns, supra note 6 at para. 54.
172. The Wagon Mound (No. 1), [Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Marts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd.],
[1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.).
173. Judgev. Canada, supra note 87 at para. 10.6 [emphasis added]; and, as a result, the HRC found
that Canada had violated its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 19 December 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada
19 May 1976).
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as it is the basis of the ECHR's decision in Soering, as well as similar
decisions by various domestic and international judicial bodies.174
If my submission that this idea of "remoteness" is a fundamental error
is correct, then the door left open by Burns and Suresh can be closed. The
kinds of gross human rights violations with which I am dealing here obviously fall into the category of prohibited punishments or treatments "that
are barbaric in themselves,"175 and which the Court held in its foundational
section 12 decision of R. v. Smith "will always outrage our standards of
decency."176 The Crown may have some section 1 arguments to make,177
but in accordance with existing section 12 case law "such arguments should
founder under the minimum intrusion test."178 The problem of extra-territoriality is avoided altogether: Canada could not extradite a fugitive to
face the death penalty, torture, indefinite imprisonment without process
and the like, because to do so would be "cruel and unusual treatment" on
the part of the Canadian government itself. The Charter stops long before
it reaches the border. This point is implicit and explicit in the current
section 7 analysis, but would produce results more compatible with
Charter values if exercised through section 12.179
The distinction between Canada delivering the punishment, as opposed
to the requesting state, will serve one useful purpose: presenting the Court
with a prime opportunity to extract the section 12 analysis from the mire
of balancing state interests with individual interests at the violation stage.
While the current section 12 case law involves a great deal of this sort of
balancing, it stems primarily from the context of minimum sentences for
domestic offences.180 The fact that the treatment/punishment is to be
consummated abroad is a distinguishing factor; it means that the only
relevant state interests are those relating to general crime prevention and

174. A similar viewpoint seems to be at play in a recent and interesting decision of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal; see Robert J. Currie, "Annotation: Purdy v. Canada (Attorney General)"
(2003), 15 C.R. (6th) 211. In this case, the Court of Appeal upheld a Charter remedy of disclosure
of an RCMP investigative file. The remedy was justified on the basis that Purdy's "right to full
answer and defence" under Section 7 of the Charter had been denied by the Crown's failure to
disclose previously — even though he was actually facing trial in the U.S.
175. Hogg, supra note 12, s. 50.3.
176. R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 at para. 56, Lamer J.
177. This was certainly the approach taken by Justice Cory in Kindler.
178. Stuart, supra note 2 at 398.
179. This approach is a limited expansion of that taken by Arbour J. when she was a lower court
Justice in R. v. Larabie (1988), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. H.C.J.), a pre-Kindler case. Justice Arbour
was, however, party to the Court's unanimous judgments in both Burns and Suresh.
180. For example, R. v. Morrisey, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 and its use of "reasonable hypotheticals"; see
Allan Manson, "Morrisey: Observations on Criminal Negligence and s. 12 Methodology" (2001), 36
C.R. (5th) 121.
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international co-operation, which as argued above must be assessed at the
section 1 phase to give any coherence to the exercise. I recognize that the
evidentiary burden on the Crown, which is already heavy under section 1,
will become more so under this analysis. Again, this is what the Charter
demands.
The current section 12 analysis might be of use in assessing allegations
that less "barbaric" punishments than those being dealt with here were
cruel and unusual; for example, onerous minimum prison terms or inhuman prison conditions within an otherwise functioning system. This would,
however, force the Court to revisit its section 7-based refusal to interfere
with extradition orders even where the prison sentence being faced by the
fugitive would likely violate section 12 if imposed in Canada.181 In any
event, while some contextual factors (such as the nature of the punishment
and the personal circumstances of the offender) would remain to be considered at the section 12 stage, I maintain that comity and other state interests are properly considered under section 1. The change in law may be
profound, but is consistent with the Court's own notional separation of its
"jurisprudence on matters involving Canada's international co-operation
in criminal investigations and prosecutions"182 from other kinds of cases.
This, I submit, was exactly the result that the La Forest Court was
trying to avoid by locating the extradition Charter analysis within section
7. By ensuring that state interests are taken into account in crafting the
content of the right, the Court was able to maintain the deferential
approach to the state's administration of its foreign affairs power183 while
still paying lip service to the Constitution by applying diluted Charter
standards. The approach outlined here would force us to confront Charter
guarantees head-on, force the Crown to bear the burden of justifying
violations, and apply the analysis in a manner which seeks to err on the
side of rights protection rather than subordinating constitutional values to
the interest of the state in co-operating with an array of questionable treaty
partners. It may also have the salutary effect of increasing pressure on the
treaty partners to discontinue the imposition of barbaric treatment.
Would assessing extradition or deportation on this basis be more

181. See United States v. Jamieson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 465 (mandatory 20-year sentence); United
States v. Whitley, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 467 (mandatory 20-year sentence); United States v. Ross, [1996] 1
S.C.R. 469 (mandatory 15-year sentence). For recent scholarship, see Daniel J. Sharfstein, "Human
Rights Beyond the War on Terrorism: Extradition Defenses Based on Prison Conditions in the United
States" (2002) 42 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1137.
182. Supra note 4.
183. The sort of approach that the Court rejected in Operation Dismantle, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
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complicated logistically than the existing system? I submit that it would
not. It would require, as the section 7 analysis currently does, the fugitive
or deportee to lead evidence on affairs in the requesting state, in fact
subjecting them to a burden of proof,184 but would spare the fugitive the
primary argument and evidence gathering regarding the political and policy
factors — which is more appropriately done by the state in any event. It
would require our judicial and quasi-judicial decision-makers to assess the
evidence regarding the requesting or destination state — no easy task, but
as Burns itself and Pacificador demonstrate, it is already a fundamental
part of what happens in extradition proceedings. If anything, the Minister's
exercise of discretion will be somewhat more tightly confined, and political concerns will have to be discounted that much more. This is not consistent with the level of curial deference traditionally accorded in these
contexts, but the rather trite response is that the Court must fulfill its role
as guardian of the Constitution if the Minister is not willing to uphold the
values contained in it.185 And protection of fundamental human rights
demands no less. To paraphrase what the Court itself has said: while Canada
may not be pulling the trigger, surely the values embodied in the Charter
forbid us from steadying the gunman's arm.186

III. Mutual Legal Assistance
The practice of sharing evidence between states in transnational criminal
matters is another area where the need for international co-operation and
comity has the potential to come into conflict with domestic human rights

184. That burden being the balance of probabilities; United States of Mexico v. Hurley (1997), 116
C.C.C. (3d) 414 (Ont. C.A.). This burden is likely to remain the same under s. 44(l)(a) of the new
Extradition Act, since the section is "a statutory embodiment of this Charter right" (Krivel et al.,
supra note 44 at 349).
185. One of Suresh's administrative law issues that is beyond the scope of this paper, but nonetheless relevant and disturbing, is the very deferential standard of review attaching to the Minister's
decision, both as regards the determination of a refugee as being "a danger to the security of Canada"
and whether he/she faces a "substantial risk of torture" upon deportation. On both decisions, the
Minister's determination can only be reversed if it is "patently unreasonable," the most deferential
standard of review. While the constitutional standard applied to the ultimate deportation decision is
section 7 and the "shocks the conscience" test, the deferential standard attaching to the decision
regarding the risk of torture, in particular, must ultimately prevent appropriate cases from even going forward for constitutional testing. This state of affairs, I suggest, presents the strong possibility
of scenarios where the political will behind "anti-terrorism" and "security" could push the Minister's
decision in a direction that undermines Canada's human rights standards, by providing an "end run"
around a determination based either on "the fundamental principles of justice" (section 7) or rights
limitations which are "justified in a free and democratic society" (section 1). In this regard, it is
perhaps not unjustified to characterize the effect of Suresh as one step forward, two steps back.
186. Suresh, supra note 7 at para. 54.
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standards. In Canada, the Court has engaged in a similar sort of "linedrawing" regarding the application of the Charter, and the lower courts
have made some tentative forays into balancing comity with constitutional
constraint of law enforcement — with mixed results.
Mutual Legal Assistance (hereinafter "MLA") is a relatively new brand
of inter-state co-operation in criminal matters that effects what might be
called an "international criminal procedure," or perhaps more accurately a
means by which the legal system of one state may be "unlocked" for and
by the prosecutors of another.187 Accomplished predominantly by treaty,
MLA agreements put in place arrangements for domestic prosecutors of
one state (the "requesting state") to make a request of the treaty partner
(the "requested state") by which the latter will gather evidence germane to
an investigation in the requesting state.188
In Canada, the inter-state obligations created by the existing MLA treaties189 are implemented by the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act,190 which sets out both the process to be followed by Canadian
authorities in making evidence-gathering requests of other states and that
to be followed by the Minister of Justice and Crown personnel in responding to incoming requests. While MLA practice has existed internationally
since the 1957 enactment of the European Convention on Mutual Assis-

187. George J. Rriz, "International Co-operation to Combat Money Laundering: The Nature and
Role of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties" (1992) 18 Commonwealth L. Bull. 723 at 729. See
generally Robert J. Currie, "Peace and Public Order: International Mutual Legal Assistance 'The
Canadian Way'" (1998) 7 Dal. J. Leg. Stud. 91 [Currie, "Peace and Public Order"]; Robert Goldstein
& Nancy Dennison, "Mutual Legal Assistance in Canadian Criminal Courts" (2002) 45 Crim. L. Q.
126; David McClean, International Co-Operation in Civil and Criminal Matters (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), especially chapters 5 and 6; William C. Gilmore, ed., Mutual Assistance in
Criminal and Business Regulatory Matters (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Rudolf
Geiger, "Legal Assistance Between States in Criminal Matters" in Encyclopedia of Public International Law,vol. Ill (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1997)201; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal Law, 2d ed. (Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational, 1998-1999), Vol. II, Section IV: "Judicial Assistance
and Mutual Cooperation in Penal Matters" at 331-486; Appendix B, "The Mutual Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matters Act and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements" in Krivel et al., supra note 44 at
487-586.
188. The terms "mutual legal assistance" and "mutual assistance" are often applied to any brand of
inter-state cooperation in criminal matters; in Burns, for example, the Court consistently referred to
extradition as "mutual assistance." The more recent trend, and the sense in which the phrase is used
here, is to equate "mutual legal assistance" with those arrangement specific to evidence-gathering
(and other matters such as transfer of prisoners).
189. There are currently bilateral treaties in place with approximately 34 states. For a reasonably
up-to-date list, see Krivel et al, supra note 44 at 488-490. Canada is also party to multilateral
arrangements under the relevant Organization of American States treaty and the 1988 United Nations Narcotics Convention (ibid.), as well as the Commonwealth Scheme (Currie, "Peace and Public Order," supra note 187 at 97-99).
190. R.S. 1985, c. 30 (4th Supp.) [the "Act"].
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tance in Criminal Matters,19^ the Canadian Act came into effect only in
1988. The expanding network of treaties, however, and in particular
Canada's MLA treaty with the U.S., is seeing more and more use, and this
in turn is generating a fair amount of case law as criminal defence lawyers
discover the Act and the broad powers it confers on the Crown. As MLA
involves the coercive exercise of powers by the state, on behalf of another
state, the litigation has mostly involved Charter-testing the Act.
1. Canada as Requesting State
Two discrete issue areas have arisen, which can be simply categorized as
"Canada as requesting state" and "Canada as requested state." In the former
category, there is a rather sparse amount of case law arising from Canadian criminal trials where the circumstances of evidence-gathering in the
requested jurisdiction were contested, usually as producing trial unfairness in the Charter sense. For the most part, courts appear to have taken
Harrer, Terry and Cook as setting out the guiding principles, and employ
the same section 7/section 24(2) framework utilized in those cases to
determine whether the actions of foreign authorities should result in exclusion of evidence.192
An interesting instance of Charter-testing the Act arose in Schreiber v.
Canada (Attorney General).193 As part of the investigation of Schreiber in
Canada, the Crown made a mutual legal assistance request194 of the
government of Switzerland, asking for seizure of records relating to bank
accounts Schreiber held in that country. Schreiber alleged that the letter of
request itself violated section 8 of the Charter, because it could be reasonably expected to result in a search and seizure for which the Crown had not
obtained a warrant. The Crown argued that the letter itself could not be
considered a "search," since any action undertaken with regard to
Schreiber's privacy would be that of the Swiss government.
In a brief majority judgment, L'Heureux-Dube J. accepted the Crown's
argument, ruling that since the letter of request was not a "search" or
"seizure" for the purposes of section 8, no warrant was required. As in
Harrer, Terry and Cook, the dominant theme was the avoidance of extra-

191. Eur. T.S. 30.
192. SeeS. v. Yashnev, [1995] OJ. No. 3599 (Gen. Div.) (QL);R. v. Gaudet (1997), 188 N.B.R. (2d)
39 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Guilbride, [2003] B.C.J. No. 389 (Prov. Ct.) (QL). See also Goldstein & Dennison,
supra note 187 at 149-66.
193. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841. For a case comment, see Currie, supra note 5. See also Stephen G.
Coughlan, "Developments in Criminal Procedure: The 1997-98 Term" (1999) 10 Sup. Ct. L. Rev.
(2d) 273 at 334.
194. By way of a "letters rogatory" request, the diplomatic precursor to MLA. For background, see
Currie, "Peace and Public Order," supra note 187 at 102-103.

Charter Without Borders?

275

territorial application of the Charter. The Court, in effect, analogized the
presence of the individual's property (here bank records) in the foreign
jurisdiction with the presence of the individual himself there. The law that
applied to the property was that of the territorial state, and having chosen
to locate himself beyond the territorial reach of the Charter Schreiber was
not entitled to the benefit of its protection, even if the exercise of state
power against him was formally initiated by the government of Canada.
The majority ruling195 was subject to a stinging dissent by lacobucci J.,
writing for himself and Gonthier J., who felt that by effectively endorsing
a warrantless search of the affairs of a Charter-protected individual, the
majority ruling undermined the prophylactic nature of the section 8
protection. The heart of the disagreement between the majority and
dissent was as to where the right to privacy was located. For Justice
lacobucci, the fact that the letter of request was part of engaging the criminal process against Schreiber was sufficient to invoke the effect of section
8, and Schreiber had a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding his property, vis-a-vis the Government of Canada, regardless of the location of the
property. For its part, L'Heureux-Dube J.'s majority was content to
"[deposit] the crux of Schreiber's Charter complaint alongside his money
in Zurich,"196 and bulwarked itself against the dissent's charge of erosion
of the section 8 protection by invoking the twin themes of avoidance of
extra-territorial application of the Charter and the importance of international co-operation in criminal matters.
If the position I have offered on the Supreme Court's "jurisprudence
on matters involving Canada's international co-operation in criminal
investigations and prosecutions"197 is to be consistent, it is worthwhile to
wonder whether in Schreiber the Court once again donned the blinders
regarding causation and remoteness that it wears in the extradition cases.
To state that the search is ultimately an act of the foreign government is
somewhat disingenuous, given that it is brought about by the request for
assistance made by the Government of Canada. As distinct from the extradition cases, the search by the requesting state could fairly be portrayed as
a vicarious action of the government of Canada,198 and there is some force

195. Lamer, C.J. (as he then was) concurred in the result, but based his analysis on the premise that
by banking in Switzerland, Schreiber had no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in his bank records
vis-a-vis the government of Canada.
196. Morgan, supra note 28 at 468.
197. Supra note 4 and accompanying text.
198. Though the ultimate decision as to whether to fulfill the request is a sovereign act of the requested state and, as the majority intimated in Schreiber, there is always the potential that the request
will be refused (see Currie, "Schreiber Case Comment," supra note 5 at 214).
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to the implicit argument in the Schreiber dissent that failing to attach
section 8 protection to the request is a triumph of form over substance.
Ultimately, however, it is the same differences from the extradition
context that support the majority's finding. At the phase of the mutual
legal assistance request by Canada, the Court was not faced with Schreiber
having made out a case, as in Burns199 or Pacificador, that the foreign
government would likely trample his human rights in fulfilling the request.
Rather, the case was truly a situation where Schreiber was arguing that the
Charter should protect him extra-territorially, even though he had chosen
to bank abroad. The decision does in some way effectively transform the
letter of request into "reasonable and probable grounds" for the foreign
search, but avoids the problematic possibility that courts may feel they are
called upon to scrutinize foreign criminal process according to Charter
standards. One is ultimately comforted by the fact that, again, the search
and its results are subjected to scrutiny at a Canadian trial, before a court
employing Charter-based standards of fair trial and exclusion of evidence.
2. Canada as Requested State
The second relevant area of MLA practice is where Canada is the requested
state, and exercises powers over persons on Canadian territory at the
behest of the requesting state. The Act provides for various modes of
evidence-gathering by the Crown, including search warrants, "evidencegathering orders",200 and the taking of witness statements. As the bulk of
case law under the Act concerns search warrants, this is the best lens through
which to examine the Charter-testing of MLA practice.201
The issuance and execution of search warrants is governed by sections
10-14 of the Act. When the Minister of Justice202 has determined that a
request should be responded to, the Crown authorities are provided with
the appropriate materials from the foreign jurisdiction to make an exparte
application for the issuance of a search warrant. The judge may issue the

199. In one way, this is a crude manner of describing the case made out by Burns and Rafay, given
that there is still no generally binding principle at international law against execution as a criminal
sanction. However, it is a fair description of the manner in which the Court reformulated the relevant human rights standard in the domestic context.
200. An investigative tool, unique to the Act, which allows the Crown to, inter alia, subpoena persons to give evidence or provide documents (see ss. 17-23.1 of the Act).
201. For a detailed and critical review of the MLA search warrant case law, see Robert J. Currie,
"Search Warrants Under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act" (2003), 12 C.R. (6th) 275.
202. Acting through Justice Canada's International Assistance Group (IAG), the departmental branch
charged with handling MLA requests. See Justice Canada, International Assistance Group: Central
Authority for Canada for Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition (Ottawa: International Assistance Group, 1995).
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warrant where satisfied by statements under oath that, inter alia, there are
reasonable grounds to believe that: an offence has been committed; and
evidence of the commission of the offence or information that may reveal
the whereabouts of the suspect will be found at the relevant site.203 The
issuing judge must also fix a time and date for a hearing to review the
execution of the warrant and determine whether the evidence will be sent
to the requesting state.
The latter hearing is governed by Section 15 of the Act, and is somewhat analogous to the extradition hearing, though the process is not bifurcated between judicial and ministerial phases. It is the stage of the process
at which the Charter has tended to be applied, and the analytical question
for present purposes is whether the courts treat the Charter concerns any
differently because this process involves foreign cooperation. Currently,
the answer appears to be yes and no.
The reviewing judge at the section 15 hearing has fairly wide discretion in terms of deciding whether evidence is to be sent or not, and is
called upon by paragraphs 15(l)(a) and (b) to assess both whether the
warrant was executed according to its terms and conditions, and whether
there is any other reason that the evidence should not be sent. This clause
has been authoritatively interpreted204 as giving the judge the power to
consider all of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
warrant, including alleged Charter violations by Canadian authorities, but
also including "the need to ensure that Canada's international obligations
are honoured and to foster co-operation between investigative authorities
in different jurisdictions."205 As a result, the constitutional analysis has
generally centered on section 8 of the Charter, rather than section 7 as in
extradition, probably because the actual liberty of the person (and the
deprivation thereof in accordance with the "fundamental principles of
justice") is seen as too remote from the evidence-gathering exercise.206
Domestic search warrants are subject to a fairly rigorous regime of

203. Supra note 190 at ss. 12(l)(a) and (b).
204. R. v. Gladwin (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 471 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1997] S.C.C.A.
No. 325 (QL); R. v. Budd (2000), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2001]
S.C.C.A. No. 57 (QL) [Budd].
205. Budd, ibid, at para. 28, citing as authority the extradition case U.S.A. v. Dynar (1997), 115
C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.).
206. Indeed, the view that individual human rights are not as directly engaged by mutual legal
assistance is often espoused by Crown-side commentators as justification for a looser approach to
human rights standards in this area; see Joan Sheedy, "International Legal Obligations Under Human Rights Instruments," in Commonwealth Secretariat, International Co-operation in Criminal
Matters: Balancing the Protection of Human Rights with the Needs of Law Enforcement (London:
Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001).
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judicial scrutiny, and the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions on section
8 of the Charter have firmly established that irregularities, either with the
warrants themselves or their execution, will generally result in the invalidation of the warrant and can result in exclusion of evidence seized thereunder.207 A review of the MLA search warrant case law, however, indicates
that while courts are applying the domestic search warrant regime to MLA
warrants, the international co-operation aspect of these cases is leading to
a looser approach than might be tolerated in a purely Canadian case, as
privacy rights are balanced against Canada's international obligations and
the need to combat transnational crime. In effect, even if a warrant or its
execution would have been constitutionally invalid if purely domestic,
Section 15 of the Act provides the reviewing judge with the discretion to
send the evidence anyway. This is, of course, analogous to what happens
domestically under section 24(2) of the Charter. What is troubling is that,
while a refusal to exclude improperly seized evidence at a domestic trial
has a constitutional basis, sending judges appear to be empowered to send
improperly seized evidence on some vague notion of the importance of
international comity.
This balance has been struck in a number of different warrant situations. In some cases, courts were willing to validate warrants despite
"facial" irregularities, such as failure to set out the appropriate section
under which the individual was charged or failure to provide the name of
the executing officer.208 A number of the more recent cases deal with the
Information which is sworn in support of the warrant, and the effect that
should be given by the reviewing judge to hearsay content therein.209 In an
Alberta case,210 the Information contained substantial uncorroborated
hearsay obtained both in Canada and in the U.S. Despite finding "serious
defects" with the warrant, and noting that it would not have issued in
Canada, the reviewing judge ordered the evidence sent. This approach has
been followed by at least one other court,211 though it was expressly

207. See generally Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.); R. v. Collins (1987),
33 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); R. v. Debot (1989), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.); R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2
S.C.R. 1421; ft. v. Araujo, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992; Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law
(Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1997); James A. Fontana, The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada,
5th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002).
208. Gladwin, supra note 204; Germany (Federal Republic) v. Ebke, 2001 NWTSC 52 [Ebke].
209. Often referred to as the issue of "sub-facial validity."
210. Alberta (Attorney General) v. Dawson, [1999] A.J. No. 809 (Q.B.), leave to appeal dismissed
[1999] A.J. No. 1332 (C.A.) (QL) and [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 570 (QL).
211. United States v. El-Jabsheh, [2002] B.C.J. No. 1349 (S.C.) (QL).
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rejected by the Quebec Court of Appeal in R. c. Future Electronique inc.212
The most recent and authoritative decision is that of the Ontario Court
of Appeal in Ontario (Commissioner of Competition) v. Falconbridge
Ltd.,2" where the affiant Canadian officer, Drapeau, swore his Information entirely on the basis of hearsay information provided by U.S. investigators, much of which had come in turn from confidential informers.
However, the Court found that the lack of information about the reliability
of the informers was counterbalanced in various ways, including Drapeau's
familiarity with the investigators, the purported and apparent first-hand
knowledge of the informer, and confirmation of some of the information
by documents which had been provided by the informer.214 Thus, the Court
of Appeal was willing to accept Drapeau's swearing of the Information,
containing information relayed by an unknown informer, to American antitrust investigators, to Drapeau, as providing reasonable and probable
grounds for the warrant. Such an Information would be more likely to be
struck in a purely domestic case.215
In other cases, however, reviewing judges have taken a tougher
approach, particularly where they have found that the requesting state is in
some manner making (or being allowed to make) an "end run" around the
domestic MLA procedure. This has arisen especially in cases where the
foreign authorities were permitted to participate in the search and even
take some of the evidence with them prior to judicial determination as to
whether or not it should be sent. One such case is Germany (Federal Republic) v. Ebke216 where the reviewing judge took note both of procedural
lapses in the execution of the warrant by Canadian officers and the participation by a foreign officer in the search (for what the Crown argued was a
"consultative" purpose). While not explicitly ruling that the Charter should
apply to MLA cases in exactly the same manner as it would domestically,
Vertes J. rejected the notion that lapses in procedure were to be tolerated in
the interests of not defeating the purposes of the Act, i.e., effecting Canadian co-operation with other states.217

212. (2000), (sub nom. United States v. Future Electronique inc.) 42 C.R. (5th) 132 (Qc. C.A.);
leave to appeal dismissed for mootness [2001] C.S.C.R. no. 82 at paras. 18-21.
213. (2003), 12 C.R. (6th) 243, leave to appeal dismissed, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 302 (QL).
214. Ibid, at paras. 31-35.
215. Though the Court of Appeal did ground its decision in domestic jurisprudence relating to informations; see ibid, at paras. 30-35.
216. Ebke, supra note 208.
217. See also Canada (A.G.) ex rel. United States v. Schneider, [2002] B.C.J. No. 1561 (B.C.S.C.
[In Chambers]) (QL); and United States v. Orphanou, [2004] OJ. No. 622 (S.C.J.), as well as my
annotation at (2004), 19 C.R. (6th) 291.
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MLA practice is still in its infancy in some respects, and the Supreme
Court of Canada has yet to speak to any of the issues that are raised when
Canada is the requested state. However, a few observations can be offered
on the case law to date. To the extent that the courts have been willing to
submerge domestic human rights standards in the interests of inter-state
co-operation, the cases are remarkable and somewhat disturbing. It is worth
noting that virtually all of Canada's MLA treaties specify that any
evidence-gathering is to be done in accordance with the law of the
requested state, and the Act is specifically designed to put in place a mechanism whereby requests can be met in accordance with domestic standards
— including the Charter. Yet even in this setting, where every aspect of
the process except the request happens on Canadian soil, where Canadian
authorities are acting, for the most part, against the interests of individuals
who are ostensibly protected by the Charter, our courts have displayed at
least a nominal willingness to dilute the rigour of our domestic human
rights standards in the interest of inter-state co-operation.
However, this important balancing factor receives virtually no thoughtful analytical attention, the courts being content to simply repeat similar
assertions made in extradition cases.218 Moreover, given that international
treaty obligations take on such importance, one is moved to remark on the
absence of any consideration by the courts of whether this dilution of
domestic human rights standards is compatible with Canada's obligations
under international human rights treaties.219 That the extent to which our
domestic human rights standards are informed by our international human
rights obligations is best described as "fuzzy" is certainly relevant,220 but
as a result the MLA cases are another set of decisions that cry out for
clarification of the issue. It may be that there is some room for the tailoring
of constitutional standards to the exigencies of the battle against
transnational crime, but this conclusion must emerge from a far more
thoughtful policy conversation than has been had to date.
This point is, I submit, all the more pressing when one considers that a

218. See e.g. Budd, supra note 204; Re Pokidyshev (1999), 27 C.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. C.A.).
219. This also raises a number of important international law issues, among them the question of
what states should do in situations where their treaty obligation to provide mutual legal assistance
conflicts with applicable human rights treaties; for a detailed discussion, see Robert J. Currie, "International Mutual Legal Assistance and Human Rights," supra note 37, at 147-67.
220. See generally William A. Schabas, "Twenty-Five Years of Public International Law at the Supreme Court of Canada" (2000) 79:2 Can. Bar Rev. 174, especially 185-91; Irit Weiser, "Undressing
the Window: Treating International Human Rights Law Meaningfully in the Canadian Commonwealth System" (2004) 37 U.B.C. L. Rev. 113; Anne Warner La Forest, "Domestic Application of
International Law in Charter Cases: Are We There Yet?" (2004) 37 U.B.C. L. Rev. 157.
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Burns-type case must inevitably arise in the MLA setting. While it is most
usual for MLA requests to be made during the investigation and evidencegathering phase of a criminal prosecution, it is hardly inconceivable that
either the request or the Section 15 hearing could occur at a time when the
individual being investigated is fully aware of the jeopardy he/she faces in
the requesting state. As a result, our courts will have to answer the same
question as in Burns: will Canada send evidence to another jurisdiction for
use in a capital case? Or perhaps a Suresh- or Pacificador-type case will
arise, where an individual requests the Section 15 judge to refuse the
sending order because he/she can present a prima facie case that gross
violations of human rights will arise from the prosecution.221
Should such a case arise, it is not unlikely that the courts will look to
the section 7 test as it has been applied in the extradition and deportation
cases for the analytical framework. Yet this setting, too, is ripe for reform
and for the recognition that Canada's actions in participating in foreign
prosecutions are not too "remote" from any gross violations of human rights
which occur in the requesting state. As the Court itself acknowledged in
Burns and Suresh, a causal link is just that, and locating the analysis under
section 12222 may be the most intellectually honest means of recognizing
this.223

Conclusion
This article has only modest goals in terms of contribution to debate on
these issues, and has touched but lightly on many matters that are highly
worthy of more substantial attention. Hopefully, it will help to engender
recognition of the fact that the debate must be had, and act as a starting

221. There is one MLA decision somewhat on point; in United Kingdom v. Wilson-Smith & Co.,
[2002] OJ. No. 5342 (Ont. S.C.J.) (QL), procedural misconduct by British authorities acting in their
own jurisdiction resulted in a finding of abuse of process and the decline of a sending order.
222. Since providing evidence to the requesting state is clearly not "punishment," open for question
would be whether it qualifies as "treatment" under section 12. Rodriguez, supra note 160 suggests
that there must be an "exercise of state control over the individual" for the action to be caught; does
this apply only to the corporeal body of the individual, or can it extend to his/her property or other
legal interests which would bear the impact of, for example, a search warrant? I have argued in
another context that "[i]t seems somewhat facile to declare that protection under a human rights
instrument extends only to a corporeal human being... it is the legal interests of this person that are
being protected, rather than just physical well-being" (Currie, "Human Rights and International
Mutual Legal Assistance," supra note 37 at 152).
223. Morever, as noted above, there is a strong stream in the international case law that assisting
another state in a human rights breach will engage the requested state's own international human
rights obligations. While this would be simply one of a number of policy considerations in such a
case, it seems appropriate for consideration under a section 1 analysis.
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point for discussion. While a critical approach has been taken to the
Supreme Court of Canada's jurisprudence on transnational crime and
co-operation, the law is in a much more satisfactory condition than it was
after Kindler.224 As Professor Roach points out, there is a great deal of
good to be spoken of both Burns and Suresh:
In both cases, the Court performed its anti-majoritarian role admirably by
examining the fundamental principles of Canadian and international law
to reach [its] conclusions.... In both cases, the Court resisted the temptation
to minimize Canadian responsibility for what will happen to a fugitive
removed from our shores. In both cases also, the Court was not blinded
by the serious nature of the charges against the Charter applicant. The
Court reminded Canadians in both cases of the values that they were
inclined to forget in the understandable urge to expel dangerous persons
from our midst.225

Burns and Suresh are clearly significant judgments, but both were simply
steps, when they could have been strides. The Court had the opportunity to
rule that it is unconstitutional to extradite people to face the death penalty
or deport them to face a realistic possibility of torture. Instead, it declined
to do so, leaving the door open to either of these possibilities being realized. Recall that Canada has been the subject of declaratory criticism by
the UN Human Rights Committee on at least two occasions226 since 1991
for the rendition of fugitives to face the death penalty, which was (or should
have been) embarrassing to a state that prides itself on its human rights
record and whose human rights jurisprudence has been highly influential
throughout the world. In a future case, the fact that the Supreme Court of
Canada found a case to be "exceptional" or "compelling" under the
sophisticated section 7 analysis would be as unlikely to find favour with
the Human Rights Committee as the earlier cases.
These questions do not come up very often, but their infrequency of
occurrence is outweighed by their significance, particularly in an era domi-

224. Burns in particular has been cited approvingly by the South African Constitutional Court in its
resolution of a similar issue; see Mohamed v. South Africa (President), [2001] S.A.J. No. 21 (Const.
Ct.) (QL). Also, in its first examination of certain amendments to the Criminal Code made by the
Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that in "investigative hearings" under section 83.28 of the Code (where witnesses may be compelled to give evidence in camera regarding terrorist offences), domestic use and derivative use immunity conferred by the statute
must be extended to extradition and deportation proceedings, in order to conform with Burns and
Suresh; see Re Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, 2004 SCC 42 at paras. 73-79.
225. Kent Roach, "Did September 11 Change Everything? Struggling to Preserve Canadian Values
in the Face of Terrorism" (2002) 47 McGill L. J. 893 at 923-24.
226. Supra notes 85 and 87 and accompanying text.
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nated by talk of "security" and the "war on terror." Disturbingly, as
Professor Sossin has argued, "[t]he Court appears willing to bend the Charter to accommodate laws and acts justified in the national security."227 One
is left wondering whether the Court has given itself the tools it needs to
deal with the tougher brand of case which may present itself. A specific
hypothetical example: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, an alleged lieutenant
of Osama bin Laden, was apprehended in Pakistan in March, 2003. He
was turned over to American authorities, who took him away to be questioned at "an undisclosed location." It was later reported that Mohammed
provided information that led to the capture of other high-ranking 'al Quaida
members.228 It would seem unlikely that Mr. Mohammed spent his
post-capture months sitting in a quiet, air-conditioned Washington room
answering questions put politely to him by U.S. military intelligence or
secret service members. It is hardly beyond the realm of possibility that he
was taken to an offshore site,229 where he would not attract any of the
considerable procedural protections in the U.S. Constitution, and quietly
tortured either by American personnel or by foreign agents hired for this
purpose.
What if Khalid Sheikh Mohammed had turned up in Prince George
instead of Pakistan? Would he be extradited to the U.S., where he would
surely be subjected to rather intense questioning and then executed after
trial? Would this be one of the "exceptional" cases to which the Court
referred in Burnsl Change the name to Osama bin Laden, and the potential
ramifications of these questions are even larger. Such a scenario certainly
makes the Court's statement in Burns that there was "little indication that
U.S. governments would ever refuse" death sentence assurances230 seem
retrospectively naive, at best. One might suggest that the discretion
bestowed upon the Minister of Justice by the new Extradition Act to extradite to face the death penalty231 could be called the "bin Laden clause."
This clause, which confirms the "exceptional circumstances" language
employed in Burns and Suresh, leaves the government leeway on particular cases, which will inevitably be shaped by public opinion as much as by
legal principle. As Professor Roach has remarked, "the permanent invitation to governments to justify exceptions from the principled rules in [Burns

227. Lome Sossin, "Developments in Administrative Law: The 2001-2002 Term" (2003) 18 Sup.
Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 41 at 59.
228. See A. Buncombe, "Attacks in Riyadh: Saudi bombs expose myth of American victory in terror
war," The Independent (14 May 2003) 5.
229. Sources indicated that he was either in Afghanistan or at Guantanamo Bay (ibid.).
230. Burns, supra note 6 at para. 138.
231. Supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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and Suresh] will present a continued challenge for the courts."232
It has been argued here that the Supreme Court's persistence in locating the constitutional implications of transnational criminal cooperation in
section 7 (along with a gutted section 1 test) pushes the "shocks the conscience" standard inappropriately high — not beyond reach, as Burns,
Suresh and Pacificador demonstrate, but high enough to allow Canadian
participation in the gross violation of human rights by other states. Extradition, deportation, and mutual legal assistance do not exist in some kind
of Westphalian vacuum of "gentlemen's agreements" and inter-state
comity, to be kept tidily separated as much as possible from the human
costs of inter-state cooperation. The growth and impact of human rights
standards in the 20th century brought with it increased recognition that
individuals were not just the objects of the law, but its subjects as well,
both on the international and domestic planes. As such, it is time to break
down the formative idea behind much of the La Forest Court's extradition
jurisprudence, that international relations exists on a higher plane and the
courts must avoid sullying the process of inter-state cooperation (a political matter) with the messy human carnage that results from it. Are we to
continue with the notion that international criminal cooperation is such a
compelling end unto itself; to be satisfied when the Crown submits that
"the Minister satisfies himself as to human rights standards in the treaty
partner state before entering into the treaty" when Canada has treaties in
place with Argentina, China, Russia, the Philippines?
The Court's recent jurisprudence is indeed encouraging.233 However, it
is time to fundamentally revisit this idea that the pressing and substantial
need for international co-operation on criminal matters, which is not quarreled with here, justifies a looser approach to how the state will be held to
the constitutional human rights standards imposed on it, particularly as
concerns torture (and other inhumane treatment), the death penalty,
slavery, freedom from retroactive criminal laws, and imprisonment
without trial. The concern for extra-territorial application of the Charter
must ultimately be seen to be misplaced, so long as the courts can truly
appreciate the implications of inter-state cooperation for the individual. To
accomplish these goals, the Charter''?, reach need not exceed its grasp.

232. Roach, supra note 225 at 925.
233. Accord, Thomas Rose, "A Delicate Balance: Extradition, Sovereignty, and Individual Rights
in the United States and Canada" (2002) 27 Yale J. Int'l L. 193 at 207-208: "Under the La Forest
Court, appeals to international law served to support the concept that individual rights were for the
sovereign to grant or withhold. With Burns, the court asserted that international law had changed
and, with it, the traditional concept of sovereignty. In regard to capital punishment, national interests were now seen as being aligned with the interests of the international community to protect
rights that are beginning to be considered universal or transnational in nature."

